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CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE
A. Introduction: The Corporate Dispute Resolution Revolution
Disputes involving corporations and other private institutions
such as hospitals, universities, and professional organizations con-
stitute a significant percentage of disputes in America. These kinds
of disputes are worth separate study because special opportunities
for the successful use of dispute avoidance, mitigation, and resolu-
tion techniques are present in these cases that generally do not
exist in disputes involving only individuals. Such disputes also
create special problems. The institutional nature of one or both
parties affects the dispute at all points in its life-during the crea-
tion of the initial perception of injury or grievance, the matura-
tion of the grievance into a dispute, the development of the dispute
into a formal type of dispute, such as litigation or arbitration, and
the processing and eventual resolution of the dispute.'
In recent years, increased awareness by corporations of the costs
of disputing and the potential savings that could be realized by
improving the handling of their disputes has fueled the growing
movement towards alternative forms of dispute resolution (ADR).
This essay describes and assesses the impact of this corporate em-
brace of alternative mechanisms for preventing, managing, and
resolving disputes. The remainder of this Introductory section
briefly sets the context within which these alternative corporate
approaches have emerged and analyzes underlying corporate
motivations for taking such a course. The next section surveys the
world of corporate litigation2 by (1) presenting a rough typology
of corporate disputes and estimating their frequency; and (2) ana-
lyzing the quantitative and qualitative impact these disputes have
on the dispute resolution problems of society. Subsequent sections
describe various novel dispute prevention, management, and
resolution techniques developed for or often applied to disputes
involving corporations, and looks at ways these alternatives can
be more fully integrated into the corporate legal function. A final
section explores the particular opportunities and problems cor-
1. This description of the maturation of a perceived injury into a dispute is
similar to the dispute transformation process described in Felstiner, The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15
LAW & Soc. REV. 631 (1980-81) and Miller, Grievances, Claims and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc. REv. 525 (1980-81).
2. The remainder of this Article focuses on "corporate" rather than "institu-
tional" disputes, but much of its analysis is equally relevant to the disputing world
of non-profit and government institutions.
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porate use of alternatives poses for the justice system. These in-
clude the potential problems of severe power disparities between
adverse parties, possible excesses and lapses in the regulatory rela-
tionship, and policy aspects of private justice procedures, including
problems of secrecy and class-based justice.
1. Setting the Corporate Context
The influence of the corporate sector on the alternatives move-
ment has been channeled mostly through relatively new institu-
tions formed explicitly for this purpose. The most prominent of
these groups are organizations of corporate counsel, such as the
Association of Corporate Counsel of America (ACCA), the Center
for Public Resources (CPR), and various ADR committees of bar
association business litigation sections, and foundations, such as
the National Institute for Dispute Resolution (NIDR), founded and
supported by other large corporate foundations. This corporate in-
terest in ADR has had a significant influence on the direction the
alternatives movement has taken, which is important to recognize
both for what it means for the future of the alternatives movement,
and for what it means for the way business (particularly business
disputing) will be conducted in the future.
To a large extent, corporate interest in ADR constitutes a con-
sumer movement at the upper end of the legal market. The ex-
pressed objective of the organizations of corporate counsel work-
ing to promote greater use of alternatives is to find ways to reduce
the costs and delays of dispute resolution by identifying, creating,
implementing, and promoting more effective (i.e. cheaper), forms
of dispute resolution. For example, in 1979 the Center for Public
Resources initiated its "Legal Program to Reduce the Costs of
Business Disputes" with leading general counsel of Fortune 500
companies (today totaling well over 100 members), on the premise
that "the corporation, particularly corporate counsel, has strong
incentives to reduce the cost of litigation and has the resources
to do so." The "agenda" of the CPR Legal Program is the "develop-
ment of private processes and practices that reduce the cost of
litigation and regulatory disputes" by (1) identification and develop-
ment of alternative dispute resolution and management techniques;
(2) "communication of pragmatic information to business, the bar,
the judiciary, law and business schools; and public institutions";
and (3) "implementation of experiments and new resources to
decrease the costs of litigation and regulatory disputes" (CENTER
FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, CPR LEGAL PROGRAM).
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ACCA, CPR, and bar committees of corporate counsel have spon-
sored numerous seminars on ADR and "cost-effective litigation
management." They have also created their own publications, such
as Alternatives and Corporate Dispute Management to promote
greater awareness and use of alternatives. Another of the major
efforts of the CPR Legal Program has been the creation of the CF'R
Judicial Panel and the initiation of the ADR Corporate Policy State-
ment. Funded by a grant from the Aetna Life & Casualty Founda-
tion, the Judicial Panel is a private dispute resolution program
utilizing the services of high-profile figures, including many former
judges, who are available to act as neutral third parties or con-
sultants in private dispute resolution (CENTER FOR PUBLIC
RESOURCES, JUDICIAL PANEL PROSPECTUS). The ADR Corporate
Policy Statement (formerly the "ADR Pledge") states that a
subscribing company will explore ADR first when in a dispute with
apy other company or institution that has also subscribed to the
pledge (ALTERNATIVES, Judge Keeton 3). As of March 1985, 96 cor-
porations had subscribed to the pledge (ALTERNATIVES, Corporate
Policy 6).
One effect of this corporate interest in alternatives has been a
.push towards greater privitization of the dispute resolution pro-
cess (TOLCHIN). The CPR Legal Program is only one example of
many attempts by institutions to develop private dispute resolu-
tion processes and free themselves from what they generally regard
as over-dependence on the public dispute processing systems. Cor-
porations have been in the forefront in the use of the private "rent-
a-judge." According to the legal press, there is a real market for
private judging. "At least seven states permit private judges to
resolve disputes with binding decisions, and in almost every major
city, former judges and lawyers have founded companies that offer
private judging services" (NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, New Panel;
TOLCHIN).
Other elements of this new consumerism by corporations have
stemmed from their being the largest purchasers of legal services
in our society. One element has been the tremendous growth of
in-house law departments and the creation of a new "gospel of the
corporate counsel." Central tenets of this gospel are the desirability
of internalizing the corporate legal function as much as possible
and increasing the "professionalism" of the corporate attorney
(AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, Saving a Buck 523). Luther
McKinney, vice president of law and corporate affairs for Quaker
Oats Company, states, "The reason for the expansion [of corporate
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law departments] boils down to money" (STATES; WESSEL,
Management). A 1981 National Law Journal survey (NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL, Boardroom; In-house) reported that among 70 cor-
porations that responded to questions about overall outside legal
costs, the average expenditure on outside lawyers in the prior year
was $3.43 million. Estimated savings from using in-house instead
of outside counsel ranged from one-third to one-half of legal bills.
Not surprisingly, many of the general counsel surveyed stated that
they intended to refer fewer cases to outside counsel and to bring
as much of the legal work as possible inside.3 Thus, even while
lawfirms have grown larger and larger, there seems to have been
a major shift in the past five years in the "make or buy" outlook
of corporations toward legal services. Citing an estimate by
Philadelphia "legal consultant" Daniel Cantor, the National Law
Journal survey stated that (as of 1981) about 71,500 attorneys,
or 13 % of the nation's lawyers, are now employed by corporations,
an increase of roughly 500% over the 12,500 lawyers employed
by corporations as recently as 1950. According to the survey, one
company, AT&T, employs over 900 lawyers, and eighteen other
companies employ over 100. All indications are that this trend is
continuing. A 1985 survey found that the number of attorneys
working for corporations has doubled over the past fifteen years,
with in-house counsel now accounting for 15 % of the nation's at-
torneys (Fox 11).
The establishment of ACCA is directly traceable to this inter-
nalization movement. The new wave of second and third level cor-
porate counsel-equivalent in professional standing to mid-career
partners in private firms-found no room for them in the existing
organizations for corporate counsel, which were based on the old
model of a corporate law department consisting of a distinguished
General Counsel and a bunch of salaried employees who were
neither encouraged nor permitted to join elite bar association com-
mittees made up of a limited number of general counsel.
Although the reduction of costs is an important reason for in-
ternalization of the legal function, Milton Wessel, one of the earliest
and strongest advocates of internalization of the corporate legal
function, contends that
3. Despite these proclamations of austerity, another study conducted by the
S.E.C. reported that corporations with an outside lawyer on the board of direc-
tors paid out more than $230 million in legal fees in 1980. One corporation, Data
General, paid more than $5 million to a law firm in which one of the members
of its Board was a partner. NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Jan. 25, 1982, at 1, col. 4.
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internalization is by no means strictly or even mainly for cost control
purposes. Its critical primary function is to insure that the quality of legal
representation is consistent with the quality of the product of the other
segments of the organization's business, and that all relevant inputs are
included in the corporate decision process (WESSEL. THE RuLE OF REASON:
Management).
Wessel continues:
"Internalization" of the corporate legal function means that all corporate
legal affairs are either handled or strictly administered by persons who
are full-time corporate employees, and who have commercial loyalties ex-
clusively to the company. Internalization should include even complex
antitrust and environmental litigation, and specialized interstate or in-
ternational tax advice.
Where the volume of legal affairs justifies it, recurring matters, no matter
how specialized, should be handled by staff attorneys alone. Where ex-
clusive internal handling is impractical, either because a specific matter
requires a specialized talent not otherwise sufficiently useful to justify
developing the needed expertise internally or because it involves a major
special staff effort for which company personnel are not available, tight
control by internal attorneys is mandated.
For the smaller corporation, where the volume of legal business is not
large enough to justify even a single skilled in-house attorney, internaliza-
tion means strict control of the legal function by a full-time lay company
employee. As earlier stated, such control is fully within the competence
of any skilled manager, given proper instructions (WESSEL. Management).
2. Evaluating Corporate Motivations
What are the real reasons why corporations have enlisted in the
alternative dispute resolution movement with such vigor? Two
driving forces behind the alternative dispute resolution movement
(GOLDBERG, GREEN, & SANDER 3) have been: (1) the desire to in-
crease access to justice for individuals and groups perceived to have
been excluded from the public dispute resolution process by its
costs or formalism (NADER & SINGER); and (2) the desire to foster
community empowerment in the dispute resolution process (e.g.,
SHONHOLTZ; GOLDBECK). Presumably, corporations and other large
institutions have both sufficient access to courts and other dispute
resolution processes and possess at least their share of community
power. Moreover, it is not readily apparent why corporations would
want those who may bring claims against them to have greater
access to justice than they do now. Thus, it is not likely that ac-
cess and community empowerment are the primary motivations
for the recent interest in alternative dispute resolution shown by
corporations.
One critical explanation is that the existing "power elite,"
through its corporate and other institutional organizations, sees
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the movement toward alternatives as a way to take over a larger
part of the dispute processing system by avoiding or subverting
the courts, which tend to equalize power disparities (ABEL). Those
who advance this view tend to see the discussion about dispute
processing alternatives as a battle for power between the powerless
and an organized corporate "power-elite." For this group, it is the
power of courts that has advanced the rights of the powerless
underclass; judicial power, even judicial monopoly, over the resolu-
tion of disputes must be preserved, and all efforts to siphon off
disputes to other forums are viewed with great suspicion (FISS,
CARLIN & HOWARD; cf. GALANTER, Why the 'HAVES').
The view of the alternatives movement that sees it as an attempt
to push the powerless out of the courts and into second-class justice
forums is curiously inconsistent with another view, also held by
many of its proponents, that the courts have been one of the,
primary institutional tools of the power elite in perpetuating class-
based justice. In fact, the corporate establishment's embracing of
alternatives for corporate disputes for disputes between themselves
is some evidence that the most powerful users of alternatives do
not regard non-judicial, private, and "softer" forms of dispute
resolution as "second-class" justice to be reported to only by those
too powerless to resist them, but rather as forums of choice.
Thus, a more plausible explanation for the corporate commu-
nity's leadership role in the alternatives movement is that even
these resourceful organizations are feeling the effects of "hyperlexis"
(MANNING). From this point of view, one could concede that the
myriad and numerous disputes involving organizations are a
natural by-product of life in a pluralistic, democratic and capitalistic
society with strong individualistic, competitive, and materialistic
forces, yet still be of the opinion that there is "too much litigation"
today. Also, tangible and intangible costs of disputing are simply
unacceptable both from a societal (BOK) and organizational
perspective. There is little empirical proof to substantiate the
"hyperlexis" claim nationally. However, what is more clearly sup-
ported by data from individual jurisdictions is that the delay and
costs associated with the adjudication of some types of cases, in
some jurisdictions, have made full adjudication (trial) of disputes
an unaffordable luxury for many disputants, even institutional
ones. In this view, then, the motivation behind corporate support
for the alternatives movement is the ostensible one-a search for
more efficient, more effective ways of processing disputes so as to
reduce overall dispute resolution transaction costs. The more
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thoughtful adherents of this point of view supplement this defini-
tion of the purposes of ADR to include better and fairer resolutions
without sacrifice of important societal values that are now protected
(or ought to be protected) by the formal adjudicative system. This
view sees corporate support for the alternatives movement as part
of a national response to a dispute resolution system that has
become out of date and in need of diversification and new products.
The Center for Public Resources' prospectus states:
The counterproductive costs of legal and regulatory conflicts are enor-
mous in social and economic terms. The courts are not dealing effectively
with the litigation explosion. The regulatory system is generating an un-
manageable number of disputes .... The Legal Program is part of CPR's
larger public mission to utilize business resources and professionals more
effectively in meeting public needs-in ways consistent with business ob-
jectives .... The Program is a coalition of leading corporate counsel,
together with academics, organizations working in areas of legal reform
and regulatory officials, that was organized to develop and communicate
pragmatic methods to reduce the social and economic costs of legal and
regulatory conflict while preserving the rights of all parties. In addition
to communicating pragmatic information on models ofpractices, here
and abroad, the CPR Legal Program is committed to ongoing research
and experimentation that will lead to new methods of avoiding and resolv-
ing disputes. With the outstanding expertise involved, the Program has
been organized to counsel corporate and non-corporate institutions to
reduce the costs of conflict and to resolve specific disputes privately
.... The Legal Program is predicated on the supposition that business-
oriented conflict predominates and the fact that the corporation, par-
ticularly corporate counsel, has strong incentives to reduce the litigation
explosion and the requisite resources to address the problem. That
premise has proved to be sound. While some of the models originated
in the public organizations involved in the Program, the corporations have
supplied the most promising innovations (CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES.
Judicial Panel).
Group motives are difficult to discern, much less prove, especially
where a cohesive group with shared values (the so-called "power-
elite" or "corporate establishment") may not really even exist.
Given the dearth of data regarding institutional disputes and the
lack of theoretical constructs to explain and understand institu-
tional goals, actions and values in this context, it probably is im-
possible to completely establish or demolish the "power-elite-
underclass conflict" explanation of corporate support for the alter-
natives movement. However, by examining the alternatives that
have been developed, implemented, and advocated by corporations
and other institutions, it may be possible to formulate tentative
answers to some of the more manageable policy issues (including
questions of how to deal with power disparities and guarantee
fairness in outcomes), raised by the use of the new alternative pro-
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cesses described below. Without attempting to answer Professor
Galanter's ultimate but concededly unanswerable question of
whether we have too much, too little, or just the right amount of
litigation involving institutions, we may begin to formulate an
answer to the question of whether we are handling what we have
in the most fair, efficient, and effective manner, and, if not, what
we ought to do about it.
B. The World of Corporate Disputes
1. The Corporate Society
We are a corporate society. We work in corporations, we obtain
our shelter, food, clothing, entertainment, education, and culture
from corporations, and we share our neighborhoods with corpora-
tions. We also do a lot of our disputing with corporations.
This is not a new phenomenon, though it is more true today than
ever. As William Whyte pointed out nearly thirty years ago in The
Organization Man and as William Ouchi observed more recently
in Theory Z, the corporate nature of our society exists in tension
with the strong individualism of American culture. Since World
War II the tendency has been more than ever in the direction of
increasing corporate size and power. The 1985 Fortune magazine
directory of the 500 largest United States industrial corporations
lists eighteen companies with more than 100,000 employees; in
1955 there were seven. Only four companies on the 1985 500 list
had fewer than 1,000 employees and the 500 companies together
employed a total of 14,195,792 people in 1985 compared to
7,850,000 in 1955. In 1985, 255 companies had more than one
billion dollars in assets in 1985 compared to nineteen in 1955, and
thirty-two companies made over ten billion dollars in sales in 1981;
there were none in 1955. This, of course, is only the top of the cor-
porate pyramid, and may reflect in part the conglomeration of
smaller corporations into larger units over the last thirty years.
2. The Number and Nature of Corporate Disputes
Data on the incidence of corporate disputes is scant. Although
the Civil Litigation Research Project (CLRP) study gathered some
data on cases involving organizations, it did not fully analyze the
data along this specific dimension. Also, the CLRP study of litiga-
tion rates focused on what it refers to as "the world of ordinary
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litigation." This world excludes extraordinarily complex or large
cases, described variously as "mega-cases," "monster cases," or
"elephants," even though the CLRP authors recognize that such
cases are important because they "involve vast resources and ma-
jor issues" (TRUBEK).
One part of the CLRP study does provide a snapshot, albeit
underexposed, of organizational disputes. In addition to its survey
of households, CLRP did a limited telephone survey of organiza-
tions (respondents having a business-use phone) to ascertain the
level of organizational disputes (TRUBEK). Of the 1,516 organiza-
tions surveyed, 21.9% reported having in the previous twelve
months settled with another nongovernmental organization some
dispute that involved at least $1,000. Nearly half of the larger
organizations (those with 100 or more employees) reported hav-
ing settled such disputes. The percentage was much lower- 16%
-for organizations with less than 100 employees. 4 The incidence
of disputes varied considerably by type of industry, from about 10%
for industries in the health services and retail trades to over 30%
for industries in the communications, electric, gas, construction,
manufacturing, and wholesale trades. Over 90% of all disputes
were "bilateral," i.e., settled without resort to any third-party
(although possibly with the help of outside lawyers). The median
respondent estimated that only four or five percent of disputes with
other organizations went to court. And those organizations that
had bilateral disputes had few. The median number of bilateral
disputes known to the respondents who had any was 1.5, and 85%
of the respondents who had disputes reported having ten or fewer
settled bilateral disputes in the previous twelve months. However,
ten of 263 respondents reported having 100 or more such disputes
within the prior year.
The CLRP study shows that most disputes (based on the most
recently terminated bilateral dispute of companies that reported
having had any settled bilateral disputes in the prior twelve months)
involved credit and lending transactions (34.3 %) or other contract
or commercial law (37.7%). 13.1% involved torts; 6.8% involved
business and corporate law (however, these tended to be larger
cases [more than $10,000 at stake] and involved the use of out-
side lawyers more than in most other types of cases); 5.1% involved
4. The CLRP report cautions that the apparently low incidence of settled
organizational disputes reported may be attributable to uninformed or reluctant
respondents or to the protracted nature of such cases so that few cases arising
in the past twelve months were settled and therefore collected in the survey.
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real property; and 3.0% involved business regulation law. Slightly
more than half of the sampled disputes involved $10,000 or less,
but, not surprisingly, large organizations (more than 100 employees)
tended to have a far greater number of large disputes (over $10,000
at stake) than smaller organizations.
Apart from the CLRP study, there is not much data on corporate
disputes and what there is tends to be spotty, unreliable, and
unorganized. A Justice Department study of numbers and types
of caseloads in five general jurisdiction courts (by county) during
six periods in this century discloses that from 1903 to 1976 com-
mercial cases have declined dramatically as a percentage of all
types of cases. However, several explanations other than a reduc-
tion in the overall quantity of these types of cases might explain
this finding. Lieberman's report of the Justice Department study
indicates that in about one-third of all cases at least one party was
a private or public institution-a relatively high percentage given
that in most tort and virtually all domestic relations cases (the most
numerous types of cases), both parties were individuals. Lieber-
man's conclusion from the Justice Department study is that
"businesses sue businesses infrequently, but they do appear with
some regularity as plaintiffs in commercial cases ... or as defen-
dants in tort actions."
The Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts does not give data on size, number,
and type of dispute by nature of disputant. The Report for 1984
shows a continuing sharp increase in products liability cases (which
tend to involve at least one organization), a trend which began in
1974. In the last four years, the number of such cases has more
than doubled. But the 1984 report also shows a decline from 1980
in private anti-trust cases. This may be a result of a shift in govern-
ment anti-trust enforcement practices, which tend to directly ef-
fect private anti-trust, piggy-back actions.
Hard data on the costs of corporate disputes is even harder to
find than data on the number, size, or type of dispute. The Ameri-
can Bar Association estimates the cost of intercorporate litigation
and associated discovery to be anywhere from $40 to $88 billion
per year (CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT), but the accuracy of
this estimate is open to question.
Thus, the available data fails to substantiate the claim that cor-
porations are facing an avalanche of litigation. This is not to say
that such an onslaught is not occurring, just that the primitive state
of our knowledge in this area may simply prevent us from demon-
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strating it. The CLRP study is the only organized study of the scope
and cost of modem civil litigation. It tells the story only for the
jurisdictions surveyed, and we know from court administrative
office reports that litigation rates, disposition rates, and delays vary
tremendously from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Even if an increase in the incidence of corporate disputes is not
demonstrable, it may be that litigation has become larger and more
complex so that the time and money demands in contending with
each dispute have grown, causing a litigation crisis for corpora-
tions. Leonard Janofsky points to the impact of the "big case" as
contributing to the current problems of cost and delay. According
to Janofsky, the big case "is ultracomplex in its factual and legal
issues and consumes a good deal of time in pretrial and trial"
(JANOFSKY). This is just the kind of extraordinary case excluded
from the CLRP survey as outside the world of ordinary litigation.
Janofsky claims that the number of big cases is "growing rapidly",
but again the data is scanty. It is true, as he points out, that litiga-
tion lasting three or more years in the federal courts has increased
at the rate far exceeding the filings in general, but there is no
evidence to indicate how many of these extended cases are "big
cases" rather than neglected cases. A former director of the Federal
Judicial Center, states that the number of complex cases filed in
the federal courts increased at a rate five times that of all civil cases
from 1968 to 1977 (EBERSOLE).
Any increase in big cases would be cause for concern. The hor-
rors of the monster case are well documented in the popular legal
press. And as Janofsky points out:
By its nature the big case has a special impact upon the judicial system
and a special impact upon the parties. A court in which a big case is pend-
ing must devote resources to it out of proportion to the remainder of its
docket, with consequent increases in the delay and also in the cost of
litigating the remaining cases. By its highly complex nature, the big case
is likely to impose upon one of the parties a disproportionate amount of
the litigation risk unrelated to the merits, to skew the balance of factors
involved in consideration of the wisdom of a particular settlement, and
to substitute a battle of attrition for the process of trial. If a jury is de-
manded, the big case may well be determined without the analytical
evaluation of evidence required by its complexity (JANOFSKY).
Despite the difficulty of substantiating a litigation explosion with
numbers or proving that litigation is too expensive for what the
litigants receive from it, it does seem true that in many jurisdic-
tions, delay in the disposition ofjudicial cases is a major problem.
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Over the last ten to twenty years, the Annual Reports of the Direc-
tor of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts have
shown a continuing increase in the median time to dispose of
federal civil cases and in the pending civil caseload per judge. The
1984 median time to dispose of federal civil cases remained the
same as it was in 1983, yet there was a 7.9% increase in the
number of civil cases pending in the U.S. district courts from June
of 1983 to June of 1984. Moreover, the volume of civil cases pend-
ing three years or more-a good measure of adjudicative delay-
increased 7.5% from 1983 to 1984 and has more than doubled
since 1975.
Leaders of the bar point to congestion and delay in some courts
as the major problem facing the system of civil litigation today.
Former President of the California Bar Association Seth Hufstedler
states:
Delay is a problem throughout most of the country, although many of
the fifty-two major jurisdictions in the United States (fifty states, the
District of Columbia and the federal system) are current and deal with
cases as rapidly as they mature. Generally, the large metropolitan courts
suffer the most from delay. Litigants may wait for up to five years to have
their cases tried in large metropolitan courts. They may have to wait an
additional two or three years for their cases to be resolved on appeal. Thus,
litigants can sometimes expect to have their suits concluded in three or
four years at best and they may have to wait six or eight years or even
longer to get a final resolution.
The costs to society of delay in the judicial system are tremendous.
Parties must wait several years to have wrongs redressed and wrongs will
thus endure. A person badly in need of funds who has a legitimate claim
to a substantial amount of money may have his or her life completely
destroyed while waiting years for recompense. The system is further
loaded with the resolution of disputes about temporary rules that govern
rights during the delay period. Inevitably, disputes arise that consume
valuable court time in dealing with the delay rather than the merits of
the case. Parties may deliberately use the delay available within the
system for economic reasons. For example, if appeals take two or three
years and commercial interest rates are high, appeals may be taken
merely to obtain delay in payment. Thus, the volume of matters in the
courts are increased by delay itself, contributing even further to delay
of the overall court process.
Delay in litigation is costly to the litigants as well. It has become com-
mon to say that the costs of litigation are a middle class problem: the poor
and near poor are aided by legal service programs and the rich can afford
litigation. This answer is too easy. If the costs of litigation are unreasonably
high for the poor and near poor, changes need to be made to reduce them,
even though the government bears much of the cost. If the costs of litiga-
tion are unreasonable for the middle class and the rich, those costs should
be reduced (HuFSTEDLER).
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3. A Typology of Traditional Corporate Dispute Resolution Pro-
cessess.
In spite of a lack of hard data on the quantity or costs of corporate
disputes, it is possible to classify such disputes qualitatively so that
we can think about whether we are handling those disputes that
exist in the most effective manner. One way to do this is accord-
ing to the type of other disputant and the other disputant's rela-
tionship to the institution. These types (and relationships) include:
(1) employees (internal); (2) consumers (external-objects of institu-
tional activities); (3) members or representatives of the general com-
munity (external-neighbors); (4) government (external-regulators);
and (5) other private organizations (external-competitors or co-
venturers). Obviously, this classification is not exhaustive. For ex-
ample, it omits one obvious and important institutional actor/
disputant-owners (shareholders)-but the five subgroups listed
above include the most numerous kinds of corporate disputants.
Corporate disputes may also be classified according to the dif-
ferent types of substantive issues they raise. These tend to depend
on the nature of the relationship between the "other disputant"
and the corporation. The types of substantive disputes correspond-
ing to the five types of disputants and relationships listed above
are: (1) employment; (2) product related; (3) environmental; (4)
regulatory; and (5) commercial.
The nature of the other disputant and the substantive issues
raised tend to channel types of disputes into certain traditional
dispute resolution processes. When one considers whether some
alternative dispute resolution process should be applied to a par-
ticular kind of dispute involving a certain kind of disputant, it is
necessary to compare the costs and benefits (intangible as well as
tangible) of the proposed process' to the process that would typically
be used if the dispute were handled traditionally.
The following typology (Table I) portrays the landscape of cor-
porate disputes, according to the criteria of type of disputant, type
of dispute, and traditional dispute resolution process. Admittedly,
the picture presented here is a rough one-like a picture of the earth
from a satellite 200 miles in space rather than from a balloon a
few thousand feet above ground or from the earth itself. But, as
with the earth itself, some interesting things about the disputing
landscape may be seen from each of these perspectives.
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TABLE I
TYPOLOGY OF TRADITIONAL
CORPORATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES
Other
Disputant
Employee
Consumer
Community
groups or
individuals
Government
Private
institution
Types of Issues
Terms and
conditions of
employment
Quality, price
and harmfulness
of product or
service
Environmental;
land use
Regulatory
Commercial
(contract, patent,
unfair competition,
anti-trust, etc.)
Traditional Dispute
Resolution Processes
NLRB/arbitration/
negotiation/union and
non-union grievance
procedures/litigation/exit
Negotiation with consumer
relations departments/FTC
and state counterpart
enforcement/small claims
courts/"lumping it"
Regulation by EPA and
state and local counterparts/
zoning process/political
action/class action litigation
Rule-making/enforcement
proceedings
Litigation/arbitration/
negotiation
4. A Typology of Alternative Corporate Dispute Resolution and
Management Processes
Litigants, lawyers, and academics have developed a large number
of alternative processes and techniques to prevent, anticipate,
mitigate, manage, and resolve disputes either outside the courts
entirely or more effectively and efficiently inside the courts. Many
of these processes and techniques are addressed directly to the
problems of cost and delay that are perceived to plague the courts
and traditional arbitration. Others appear to be motivated by a
desire to obtain "better" outcomes, perhaps by having a more ex-
perienced or expert third party decide the dispute than might occur
in court, or by substituting a process that allows for a greater
variety of results, or which leads to a better long-term relationship
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between the parties. Thus, many of the alternative processes and
techniques attempt to shift a dispute from the "win-lose," adver-
sarial context associated with adjudication to a less adversarial,
bargaining situation in which the disputants have more outcome
options and control.
Some organizations of corporate disputants initially focused on
purely private alternative dispute resolution processes on the
theory that private processes could be more expeditiously put in
place by an organization or contesting parties than reforms directed
at the court system, which is less free to experiment than are
private parties. Another reason for this initial focus on private alter-
natives was the belief that such processes not only redirect cor-
porate resources to productive activities by promoting quicker
dispute resolution than the courts can provide, they also help to
reduce the large public cost of maintaining the regulatory and
judicial system. It was soon realized, however, that purely private
processes were inadequate to the size of the problem and that it
would be necessary to utilize alternatives that modify, but which
are located within or next to, more traditional public processes.
Thus, the alternative processes and techniques described below
span the spectrum from those that are located wholly within the
institutional disputant and involve no outside third-party (e.g.
litigation management systems, dispute audits), to those that (1)
involve both disputants yet no public participation, but may re-
quire the participation of a third-party neutral (e.g. ombudsman,
the mini-trial); (2) consist of a mixture of private and public in that
a private process is grafted onto or incorporated into a public pro-
cess (e.g. private arbitration, rent-a-judge); or (3) which are located
completely within the public context (e.g. court-ordered arbitra-
tion, regulatory bargaining; joint fact-finding with a regulatory
agency; joint permitting procedures).
Like the traditional processes listed in Table I, the alternative
processes and techniques may also be classified according to the
types of cases in which they are most often utilized, employing
the "other disputant" and "types of issues" categories of Table
I. Table II does this for the alternative process by expanding Table
I to include another column which lists the alternative dispute
resolution processes used most frequently by corporations to pre-
vent, manage, or resolve (1) employee; (2) consumer; (3) community;
(4) government; and (5) inter-institutional disputes, respectively.
Many of the early efforts by corporations to develop alternative
dispute resolution and management processes also focused on the
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last category-inter-corporate or inter-institutional disputes-for
reasons similar to the early focus on internal and purely private
processes. Inter-corporate disputes usually involve issues of private
rather than public law and pose fewer public policy problems in
bypassing formal procedures. ADR processes in this context are
simply an extension of the settlement negotiation process carried
on between parties of roughly equal power and can be quickly and
easily implemented solely by agreement of the parties. The other
categories of disputes, especially those involving employee, con-
sumer, and community disputes, often involve individuals whose
relatively weaker position is buttressed by statutes, such as anti-
discrimination, warranty, and environmental laws, that can make
the use of private alternatives more complicated. In addition, in
the early phases of the alternatives movement, there were doubts
that government parties could, should, or would be willing to
engage in informal processes that did not involve all of the adminis-
trative protections of traditional processes. Nonetheless, as the
alternatives movement has gathered steam, there has been a broad-
ening application of alternatives to all of these kinds of disputes.
Examples of ADR in each of these areas, together with a critical
examination of their potential, are collected in separate chapters
on intra-institutional, consumer, environmental, intergovernmental,
and international disputes in DISPUTE RESOLUTION. (GOLDBERG.
GREEN, & SANDER 371, 389, 403, 437, 443).
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TABLE III
Typology of Corporate Dispute
Resolution and Management Techniques
and Processes by Dispute State
I. Dispute Anticipation and Prevention
Dispute management audit
Environmental compliance and consumer relations programs
Corporate ambassador
Internal employee grievance mechanisms
Consensus building
Ombudsman
II. Dispute Management
Litigation risk analysis
Litigation budgeting
Aggregate caseload management
"Dataclaim"
III. Dispute Resolution
Mini-Trial
Summary jury trial
Neutral expert fact-finding
Ombudsman
Settlement special masters
Private judging ("rent-a-judge")
Industry-wide self-regulatory dispute resolution
Mediation
Med-arb
Negotiated development
Regulatory bargaining ("reg-neg")
Arbitration (private and court-ordered)
1986] 223
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
a. Dispute Anticipation and Prevention Techniques
These processes attempt either to (1) predict what people will
do in a given situation and steer the institution away from dispute-
producing behavior; (2) involve parties with interests possibly
adverse to the institution early in the decision-making process so
as to accommodate their point-of-view and head off later disputes;
or (3) create an outlet for the airing, accommodation, and resolution
of grievances before they mature into disputes (see generally FINE).
i. Dispute Management Audit
A good example of the first type of anticipation and prevention
technique is the dispute management audit. Akin to the American
Arbitration Association's Arbitration Audit (AKSEN), the dispute
management audit consists of a systematic and independent review
of an institution's activities to identify and analyze dispute sources,
with particular attention to those that produce the most trouble-
some, recurrent, and expensive disputes. The audit provides a
detailed tracing of the processes by which disputes mature (or do
not) into formal confrontations, and recommends ways in which
they can be avoided, mitigated, or resolved before maturation.
Often recommendations will include standard use of a dispute
resolution contract clause specifying one of the alternative dispute
resolution techniques described below (GREEN & JACOBS).
A full-blown dispute management audit might go beyond the an-
ticipation and prevention stages and provide cost/benefit analysis
of the ways in which the institution handles disputes, probable out-
comes if the disputes are handled in different ways, and a descrip-
tion of what information, if available, might have induced the
timely use of more efficient or effective mitigation or resolution
techniques (HAMILTON).
For example, a dispute management audit tailored for a con-
sumer service company that receives numerous complaints as a
natural by-product of its business would attempt to reveal:
(a) how, and how well, consumer relations employees absorb in-
formation material to a consumer request;
(b) how employees conceptualize problems presented by con-
sumer requests;
(c) what procedures and rules of thumb employees actually
follow to handle consumer requests;
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(d) which of many possible changes in the facts of the situtation
would cause a change in the handling procedure;
(e) what relations, if any, actual handling procedures bear to
corporate policies governing consumer relations problems;
(f) why employees believe it desirable and/or necessary to de-
viate from established corporate policy; and
(g) what happens when a problem is handed up the line, through
the point that it reaches the courtroom.
With modem electronic data processing technology, it is possible
to quantify much of this information and to create models to depict
behavior patterns and choices. Highly sophisticated dispute man-
agement procedures employing computer-aided analysis have been
developed and used successfully to analyze and improve the ways
that insurance claims adjusters deal with casualty claims
(HAMILTON; GOSNER & WILHELM). Obviously, these management
systems also can serve an anticipation/prevention function.
ii. Consumer Relations Programs
As a result of a comprehensive task force study which, in essence,
performed a dispute management audit, the Bank of America
established an apparently effective dispute prevention and mitiga-
tion program to handle routine consumer complaints (DAUER,
Preface). After identifying the typical reasons why bank customers
complain and the major problems in how those complaints were
handled, the task force came up with an eight-point dispute pre-
vention program for the bank:
1. Determine areas in which consumer problems may arise and
attempt to prevent such problems.
2. Elicit consumer opinion concerning the bank's procedures.
3. Provide continuing training for bank employees who deal
with the public.
4. Provide incentives for employees to develop sensitivity towards
consumer issues.
5. Educate the consumer about the services that he can-and
cannot-expect from the bank, including the complaint
system and procedures for utilizing it.
6. Provide reference, if necessary, to a third party decision-
maker.
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7. Provide a central location for consumers to relate problems.
8. Assure that written responses to complaints are simple and
clear and avoid the appearance of form letters.
Each unit dealing with the public should appoint one or more
employees (preferably, in the case of bank branches, the manager)
to handle customer disputes. The first employee contacted
should, while the customer listens, explain the customer's com-
plaint to the decision-maker so that the customer is not obliged
to explain again. If the decision-maker is unable to resolve the
dispute to the customer's satisfaction, the customer should be
told about The Consumer Relations Program. Brochures about
this service should be available in each branch.
A Consumer Relations office, should be established and have
broad authority to resolve consumer disputes. The Consumer
Relations office should be provided with an ample and exper-
ienced staff (a permanent director and a rotating staff of exper-
ienced bankers). It should be given investigative authority to
enable it to arrive at an accurate assessment and a reasonable
recommendation. The office should be separately funded and
have separate settlement authority for amounts up to $1,000,
so it may more objectively review and settle consumer disputes.
The region, branch or department involved should be notified
of the dispute and the office's recommendation, and some finan-
cial incentive should be developed to cause employees at the
branch to want to perform the resolution function (DAUER, The
Consumer Relations Program).
iii. Environmental Compliance Programs
An example of a dispute identification and prevention program
in the environmental/regulatory area is Allied Chemical's Environ-
mental Organizational Program (PLAUT & WALLUM). Allied Chem-
ical's program includes the establishment of a Corporate Environ-
mental Affairs Department (CEAD) responsible for policies, overall
programs, and coordination in the environmental assurance area,
including surveillance activities, review of environmental finan-
cial matters and the regulatory interface. To keep abreast of chang-
ing federal, state, and local environmental laws and regulations,
Allied's CEAD maintains daily communications among operating
staff responsible for environmental problems, requires regular
reports from managers, and conducts periodic seminars on topics
of general environmental interest. The CEAD prepares and dis-
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tributes numerous guidelines on environmental requirements to
operating personnel and actively attempts to identify and manage
risks that are (1) known; (2) known but unquantified; and (3)
unknown. Allied also maintains a Toxic Risk Assessment Com-
mittee to ensure compliance in a coherent and organized manner
with its responsibilities under the Toxic Substances Control Act
of 1976. This Committee is made up of six representatives of CEAD
and a corporation lawyer who together receive the reports of
operating staff and decide whether information should be reported
to EPA. This is a subject which itself can be the source of disputes
within the corporation because of the civil and criminal penalties
attaching to the corporation and its employees for failure to report
required information.
iv. Corporate Ambassador
A dispute anticipation and prevention program famous in the
high-tech world was IBM's "corporate ambassador" program.
Designed to respond to potential disputes with IBM customers who
also were its competitors, the aim of the program was to avoid con-
tention by opening up broader avenues of communication,
establishing wider and earlier collaboration among potential adver-
saries who needed each other, and enhancing relationships that
were continuing and long term (DAUER, Preface).
v. Internal Employee Grievance Mechanisms
Professor Alan Westin has studied a number of corporations that
have established internal complaint mechanisms to mitigate or pre-
vent employee disputes (WESTIN). A survey of employee com-
plaints undertaken by Westin for the Center for Public Resources,
in collaboration with the Educational Fund for Individual Rights
reported a strong trend toward increasing employee disputes and
rising costs for institutions in coping with these disputes. A later,
more extensive study conducted by Westin and Michael Baker
under a grant from Xerox Corp. identified a large number and
variety of internal complaint mechanisms in corporations and
universities that successfully prevent a large number of employ-
ment related disputes from escalating into lawsuits.
vi. Consensus Building
Examples of the use of consensus building to avoid or mitigate
disputes are the National Coal Policy Project (CENTER FOR
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STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; MURRAY), and the Wiscon-
sin Mining program (PESHEK). Both of these programs brought
together diverse groups of interests, including industry representa-
tives and environmentalists, to try to resolve difficult environ-
mental policy issues in a cooperative way. The participants in these
projects enthusiastically describe them as a superior method of
reaching a reasonable solution to difficult problems that often pro-
voke disputes that take years to resolve.
Another example is the "negotiated investment strategy" (NIS)
developed by the Charles Kettering Foundation to bring about a
coordinated plan for the allocation of public and private resources
to achieving mutually agreed-on objectives. It does this by offer-
ing a substitute for exhortations to cooperate: a multi-group nego-
tiation process orchestrated by an experienced mediator (WATTS
14-15). This process has been applied successfully in a number
of projects in Ohio, Connecticut, and Massachusetts (SUSSKIND &
OZAWA).
vii. Ombudsman
Examples of this type of preventive mechanism are M.I.T.'s and
Control Data Corporation's (REED) ombudsman programs. The
MIT program is described as "an upward-feedback-mediation
model" (ROWE; ROWE & BAKER), designed in part to bring
employee concerns to line managers in an orderly, timely and sup-
portive fashion so that changes in university policies can be made
to eliminate the sources of recurring problems. The procedure
explicitly encourages a reasonable expression, as early as possible,
of inquiries, concerns, complaints, and grievances in an informal
as well as formal context. The process is designed to be consumer-
driven with a stated purpose of encouraging employees to air prob-
lems early so that they can be corrected before complaints harden
into grievances, and grievances into disputes.
b. Dispute Management Processes and Techniques
In the past few years there has been a great outpouring of
literature on the management of disputes. Schemes ranging from
simple budgeting plans to sophisticated computerized litigation
management programs have been promoted as a way for institu-
tions to contain their dispute-related costs (see generally TAYLOR,
FINE, & MOUKAD).
On a conceptual level, this development represents a reversal
of the traditional view that litigation is an intrusive event and an
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exceptional corporate output. Under the traditional view, disputes
were unusual and unwelcome events to be handled by outside pro-
fessionals, not managed like the rest of the business. The new
dispute management models start from the assumption that dis-
putes are a normal (if unintended) corporate by-product capable
of being managed by the same tools the corporation uses to manage
its other profit centers-cost accounting, analysis by teams of ex-
perts, and exercise of business judgment. In the modem model,
litigation is an investment problem and the general counsel is the
manager of these investments rather than a detached legal pro-
fessional involved mostly in purchasing litigation services from out-
side firms. The general counsel today is expected to manage a large
law office, apply the skills and tools of the business manager, and
make business judgments about cases the same way as other
managers make judgments about other corporate investments
(DAUER).
i. Litigation Risk Analysis
Mark Victor, Director of the Center for Litigation Risk Analysis,
has been one of the earliest and most vigorous proponents of the
use of risk analysis in valuing litigation and making dispute resolu-
tion decisions. For several years now, Victor has held intensive,
one-day briefing sessions at various locations around the country
for general counsel, private lawyers, and managers on the subject
of "litigation risk analysis," which he describes as a "procedure
for placing a dollar value on actual and potential legal problems."
Victor's method consists essentially of using a decision tree to
assess the probabilities of certain litigation outcomes and their
dollar values (VICTOR).
Similar techniques, although in a more sophisticated format, are
described by Bodily (BODILY). Bodily's model uses the same deci-
sion tree and decision analysis approach that Victor uses to deter-
mine the efficacy of litigation choices, such as litigate or settle, and
the dollar value of each of these choices. It also explains how to
compute the average monetary outcome of decisions made with
current information and quantify the expected value of perfect in-
formation. This last datum can then be used to decide how much
to invest in discovery and legal research.
Bodily cautions that the application of decision analysis to litiga-
tion is subject to a number of obstructions and pitfalls. "The prob-
lems chiefly center around human limitations in processing infor-
mation, organizational weaknesses, and the complex nature of the
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competitive situation." Nonetheless, he contends that lawyers have
much to gain from the use of decision analysis and that executives
have much to gain from actively managing litigation rather than
relying on the lawyers as the experts on any legal matters. "Legal
counsel should be used like other high-priced experts: for advice,
not as a substitute for good management. Settlement and litiga-
tion strategy decisions, like other strategy decisions, should not
be delegated but kept in the hands of the chief executive officer
or board of directors."
Bodily denies that the unknowns and uncertainties of litigation
are too great to be quantified. "The possible results of any litiga-
tion are no more difficult to forecast and analyze than, say, the
possible success of any new product on the drawing board." He
advises that a case may be a good candidate for decision analysis
if a good deal of uncertainty exists, the case is complex and a
number of factors render a seat-of-the-pants judgment difficult, if
a case has a potentially large financial impact on a company, or
if neither a company nor its decision maker has fully formed goals
or preferences.
ii. Litigation Budgeting
Not all the proponents of litigation risk analysis and cost control
are MBA's. Robert Banks, vice president and general counsel of
Xerox Corporation, has long championed the virtues of budgetary
planning in litigation (BANKS). Borrowing from procedures and
practices that the corporation had been following for years in other
areas of its business operations, Banks has the lawyers in his law
department draw up a one year plan for each case. The plan is up-
dated with a monthly outlook and periodically compared to actual
results. Senior managers of the law department are responsible
for drafting their own litigation budgets, and a total budget for the
law department is put together on a quarterly basis.
Banks contends that the Xerox litigation cost control system pro-
duces many benefits without imposing any burdens. He claims that
its implementation required no increment in manpower and pro-
vides an invaluable planning tool and benchmark against which
to measure progress and problems. Banks also contends that the
use of case budgets promotes more realistic settlement evaluation
and permits continuing management review of litigation strategy
and tactics. Most important, he says, "The system creates a cost-
conscious atmosphere. Considerable expense is saved by the simple
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awareness by house counsel that his budget will be reviewed. Out-
side counsel also is put on notice that we do not have a spare-no-
expense attitude." (BANKS).
it. Aggregate Case Load Management
Boise Cascade Corporation has gone Xerox one better and devel-
oped an automated litigation management program that provides
"aggregate case load management" and "computer-assisted
techniques for individual case analysis" (GONSER). The aggregate
case load management system is designed to capture all pertinent
data on every lawsuit in which the company is a party. This data
base is used not only to provide each attorney with updates of her
case management responsibilities, but also to alert the attorney
to "runaway" cases-those which have accumulated dispropor-
tionate fees or those in which progress is slower than anticipated.
Such cases are investigated to see what policy reasons justify con-
tinuing legal costs that appear disproportionate to the potential
outcome. The data base is also used to identify cases relating to
particular corporate divisions responsible for production of par-
ticular products so as to identify possible increases or decreases
in disputes relating to product quality or claims handling pro-
cedures. The data base can also generate computer graphics show-
ing the total case load for the company over the past year with a
projected trend analysis for the next one to five years.
Boise Cascade's individual case analysis system is entirely dis-
tinct from the aggregate caseload management system. The in-
dividual case analysis program attempts to value the total eco-
nomic impact of a lawsuit upon the company, which it labels the
"investment value" ("INVALUE") of a lawsuit. The system is an
interactive and self-instructive program which poses a series of
questions concerning the lawsuit to the responsible lawyer. All the
questions require numeric responses, some in dollars and others
in the form of numerical ratings on the applicability of various fac-
tors which may or may not be pertinent to a specific lawsuit. These
questions fall into three general categories: (1) exposure factors;
(2) the direct and indirect financial costs of the lawsuit; and (3) sub-
jective factors that may be applicable to any defense strategy. After
obtaining answers to these questions, the computer produces a
statement of the investment value of the case, i.e., "the net ag-
gregate economic impact of all factors pertinent to the lawsuit."
According to Gonser, the use of computerized case analysis in-
sures that all relevant factors will be considered by the responsible
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attorney in reaching an opinion as to the value of the case. In ad-
dition, a printout of the program provides an historic record of how
the case was initially and subsequently appraised. The model also
insures that all cases will be evaluated consistently so that the com-
pany can establish priority among lawsuits and direct its resources
to those cases that have the greatest overall economic impact on
the company. Finally, by comparing the investment value calcula-
tion to anticipated costs, an early cost-effective defense strategy
can be formulated.
iv. "Dataclaim"
Hamilton, Rabinovitz, Szanton and Alschuler's "Dataclaim" in
many ways is the insurance claim management analogue to
Xerox's litigation cost control system and Boise Cascade automated
litigation management systems (HAMILTON). Employing many of
the same data gathering and computer analysis techniques as the
other systems, the Dataclaim program is designed to explain to
insurers how, and in what amount, standardized claims are valued,
how much valuation is influenced by up to 50 specialized factors,
how claim reserves are set and adjusted, how claims are negotiated,
and how these factors vary with the personal and professional ex-
perience of the claim handler.
Since insurance companies handle more claims and disputes
than any other type of enterprise, one would expect that
sophisticated dispute management tools would have developed in
that industry. This appears not to be the case, however. Aside from
Dataclaim, insurance company claims departments seem to be us-
ing the same ad hoc approaches to dispute valuation and manage-
ment as most lawyers.
c. Resolution Processes and Techniques.
A large number of novel alternative dispute resolution processes
and techniques have been applied with successful results to set-
tle institutional disputes that have not been anticipated or pre-
vented and which may or may not have been managed well (see
generally TAYLOR). Many of these techniques are hybrids combin-
ing various characteristics of the primary dispute resolution pro-
cesses (adjudication, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation) in
new combinations. These alternative processes and techniques
range from the purely private to the purely public, with some pro-
cesses employing both private and public parts. They run the
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gamut from binding to nonbinding. Although some of the processes
were created as a custom-tailored response to a particular dispute,
they share certain common characteristics. For example, they tend:
1. to re-translate the dispute from a legalistic fight into a prob-
lem to be dealt with on its original terms;
2. to be co-operative rather than aggressively adversarial, at
least to the extent of depending on the parties' willingness
to discuss the dispute openly and in good faith;
3. to involve a neutral third party of the disputants' own selec-
tion at least as a facilitator; and
4. to involve new respresentatives of the parties-often non-
lawyers- with authority to resolve the dispute (DAUER).
To understand how these new processes differ from the more
familiar primary processes of adjudication, arbitration, mediation,
and pure negotiation, and from each other, their salient character-
istics are set forth in Table IV (GOLDBERG, GREEN, & SANDER 8-9). 5
The more important of these new processes are described in more
detail below, together with other processes that have particular
significance to institutional disputes.
5. The original version of this Table first appeared in Green, A Comprehen-
sive Approach to the Theory and Practice of Dispute Resolution, 34 J.OF LEGAL
EDUC. 245, 257 (1984) and Green, Getting Out of Court-Private Resolution of
Civil Disputes, 28 BOSTON BAR J. 11,11 (1984).
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i. Mini-Trial.
The mini-trial is the leading example of the new hybrid corporate
private dispute resolution processes (GOLDBERG, GREEN & SANDER
271; BUTLER; GREEN, Avoiding the Legal Log Jam, Resolution,
CPR Legal Program, Growth, Proceedings; GREEN, MARKS &
OLSON; JANICKS; WRAY; ZAMPANO). It essentially structures private
negotiation by combining elements of negotiation, mediation, and
adjudication in a new way. The mini-trial is used most often in
business disputes when the parties are at an impasse because of
a good faith disagreement about the likely outcome if the dispute
is litigated, the existence of emotional barriers to resolution caused
by the parties' (or, sometimes, the lawyers') personal antagonism,
or the parties' inability to fashion a settlement that is responsive
to all of their needs and rights.
A mini-trial can overcome a negotiation impasse by doing the
following:
(a) Focusing the negotiation on the legal merits at the heart of
the dispute, thus overcoming the barrier to resolution caused by
the parties' differing assessments of the likely outcome of the case
in court; and
(b) Reconverting into a business problem what has often been
transformed by the litigation process into a technical, lawyers'
fight. This reconversion is achieved by bringing in new
negotiators-usually high level, nonlegal managers who are not
emotionally involved in the dispute, but who have authority to set-
tle the case and who can view the dispute in a broader context in
which imaginative, integrative solutions are more likely to be
found. The presence of these nonlegal representatives of the clients
also brings together the true parties in interest, who often are bet-
ter able than the legal representatives to assess the strategic risks
and overall importance of the case to the client.
Although the specific procedures of a mini-trial may vary depen-
ding on the case and the parties' desires, most mini-trials contain
these key elements:
(1) The parties voluntarily agree to conduct a mini-trial. There
is no statutory, regulatory, or (usually) contractual obligation to
participate in a mini-trial. Parties may terminate the mini-trial at
any time.
(2) The parties negotiate and sign a "protocol" or procedural
agreement that spells out the steps and timing of the mini-trial
process. This agreement usually specifies the parties' obligations
and responsibilities in the mini-trial process, their right to terminate
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the process, and certain legal matters such as confidentiality of
the proceedings and the effect of the process on any pending or
future litigation. This agreement may be quite short and simple
or it may resemble ad hoc, private rules of civil procedure.
(3) Prior to the mini-trial, the parties informally exchange key
documents, exhibits, summaries of witnesses' testimony, and short
introductory statements in the nature of briefs. If necessary, the
parties may engage in shortened, expedited depositions and other
discovery without prejudice to their right to take full discovery later
if the mini-trial does not settle the case.
(4) The parties select a mutually acceptable neutral advisor to
preside over the mini-trial. Unlike an arbitrator or judge, the neutral
advisor has no authority to make a binding decision, but at the
mini-trial, the neutral advisor may ask questions that probe the
strengths and weaknesses of each party's case. Also, after the mini-
trial the neutral advisor may be asked by the parties' represen-
tatives to advise them on what the likely outcome would be if the
case went to trial. Selection of a respected neutral advisor with
credibility is very important for each side. One of the principal goals
of the participants if they cannot obtain a favorable settlement in
direct negotiations is to persuade the neutral advisor to advise the
opponent that it would be better off settling than taking the case
to trial.
In most mini-trials, the parties select a former judge as the neutral
advisor because they believe that a person with prior judicial ex-
perience is best able to give them sound advice on likely trial out-
comes. But parties generally try to select a former judge who
recognizes the difference between the adjudicative function and
the advisory role the neutral advisor plays at a mini-trial. In some
mini-trials, especially those that turn on the resolution of a
technical or economic issue, the parties may select a nonjudicial
expert in the subject matter as the neutral advisor. In other mini-
trials, the parties dispense with the neutral advisor altogether and
rely solely on their business representatives to preside over the
mini-trial and to conduct the negotiations privately. Another ap-
proach used at some mini-trials is to have a less active facilitator
set up the mini-trial and chair it, but not advise the parties as to
likely trial outcomes. In still other cases, the parties want the
neutral advisor to attempt to mediate a resolution of the dispute.
The function the neutral advisor is expected to perform will deter-
mine the kind of person best suited for the role. As a practical
matter, however, it may be difficult to know in advance what will
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be required of the neutral advisor. Thus, the most successful neu-
tral advisors have been those who are capable of playing the roles
of advisor, mediator, and facilitator as the situation dictates and
the parties ultimately determine.
(5) At the mini-trial itself, the parties' lawyers make concise,
summary presentations of their best case. Mini-trials may last
from half a day to three or four days (two days is average). Thus,
presentations are usually limited to from one to six hours for each
side, depending on the complexity of the issues. Generally, each
party retains complete discretion over how it will use its allotted
time. In some cases, the entire presentation is made by the lawyers,
similar to an appellate or closing argument. In others, the lawyers
call key witnesses to explain parts of the case. Often, key
documents are used to explain the case. Quite often, the parties'
experts testify on technical issues. At other mini-trials, parties have
used movies, views of the scene, and other imaginative devices to
communicate the essence of a case in the short time allotted.
At the mini-trial, rules of evidence do not apply. Thus, if there
is testimony by witnesses, it tends to be in a narrative form under
informal questioning by counsel rather than in the precise ques-
tion and answer form of trial examination. In most mini-trials, time
is set aside for rebuttal. This may include an opportunity for ques-
tions to opposing counsel, witnesses, and experts, again in an in-
formal, modified cross-examination format. It may also include an
open question and answer session in which expert may question
expert, lawyer may question lawyer, and client may question client,
or any variation of these combinations.
Although mini-trial formats may vary considerably, the common
goal is to employ a procedure that effectively draws out the
strengths and weaknesses of each side, including the per-
suasiveness of counsel and witnesses, in a short time.
(6) Mini-trial presentations are made to high-level represen-
tatives of the parties who have clear settlement authority. In most
cases, the representatives are nonlawyers who have not been in-
volved in creating or trying to resolve the underlying dispute, but
who have authority or at least persuasive power over the decision
of whether to settle. In cases involving businesses, the party
representatives are generally at least one level higher in the cor-
porate hierarchy than the business people who have been involved
in the case prior to the mini-trial.
At the mini-trial, the nonlegal party representatives listen,
observe, and ask questions to clarify points, much like a judge or
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arbitrator would, but they do not sit with or assist the advocates.
Immediately after the parties' adversarial presentations on the
merits of the case, the nonlegal representatives meet privately and
attempt to negotiate a resolution. The theory behind the mini-trial
is that the party representatives, armed with a crash course on the
merits of the dispute (but without any emotional or face-saving
motivations) and aware of the larger interests of their side, will be
better able than the advocates or lower-level party representatives
to appraise their positions and negotiate a mutually beneficial
settlement.
(7) If the nonlegal representatives are unable to negotiate a set-
tlement immediately after the mini-trial, they may schedule fur-
ther talks or presentations. They may also call in the neutral ad-
visor and ask for the advisor's views on likely trial outcomes. In
the negotiation terminology of Fisher and Ury, the neutral advisor's
opinion gives both sides an expert's view of its BATNA--"best alter-
native to a negotiated agreement." (FISHER & URY). Armed with this
data, the nonlegal representatives may negotiate further. If a set-
tlement is reached, the dispute is over, as with any negotiated set-
tlement, and any pending litigation is dismissed. If the case is not
settled, the parties are free to resume any other dispute resolution
process including adjudication. Most mini-trial agreements specify,
however, that the entire process, including the opinion of the
neutral advisor and any statements made in the course of the mini-
trial, is confidential and inadmissible in any subsequent pro-
ceeding. The parties also agree that the neutral advisor may not
testify or consult with any party in that case.
The hybrid nature of the mini-trial should be apparent from this
description. For example, the mini-trial provides the parties the
opportunity to present proofs and arguments on the merits of the
case-Fuller's classic definition of adjudication (FULLER, The
Forms)-but in a process that has greater capacity to arrive at
"win/win" results (negotiation) because the business represen-
tatives can work out their own integrative solution. The parties
set their own rules of procedure and select a third party to help
them resolve the dispute by considering the proper outcome (arbi-
tration). But the third party has no binding decision-making ca-
pacity (mediation). The procedure is private (arbitration, media-
tion, negotiation), but is usually carried on within the structure
of an on-going adjudication, and the goal is agreement rather than
consistency with substantive law (negotiation and mediation).
The first mini-trial was held in 1977 to resolve a legally and
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technically complex patent infringement case. Since then it has
been used to settle product liability (GREEN, CPR Legal Program),
commercial, contract (GORSKE), distributor termination, insurance
(ALTERNATIVES, Judge Keeton), construction (ALTERNATIVES,
Austin Industries), employee grievance (WRAY), toxic tort
(BUTLER), anti-trust, and trade secret cases (ALTERNATIVES, Gillette
Mini-Trial). Most of the mini-trials have involved multi-party
disputes and some have involved cases between individual plain-
tiffs and businesses. Others have involved governmental entities.
While most mini-trials have been conducted under custom-
structured ad hoc procedures, there is a growing tendency to at-
tempt to codify the mini-trial. In 1984, the Zurich, Switzerland
Chamber of Commerce established the first public mini-trial forum
and panel complete with rules. Shortly thereafter, the Center for
Public Resources announced that it would act as an administrator
for mini-trials under rules it would promulgate.
The following factors should be considered to determine whether
a mini-trial might be employed, and the exact form it might take:
- Stages of the dispute
- Types of issues at the heart of the dispute
- Motivations and relationship of the parties
Stage of the dispute. Some mini-trials have occurred prior to
commencement of any litigation. More often, however, a mini-trial
takes place after enough pretrial discovery and sparring have been
conducted to educate the parties somewhat about the disputed
issues of the case and bring home to them the cost of continuing
litigative combat. Obviously, the earlier in the dispute the mini-
trial can occur, the greater are the cost-savings that can be achieved.
Deciding when to conduct a mini-trial requires that each party
make a cost/benefit analysis of the value of obtaining additional
information before talking settlement.
Types of issues. Experience to date indicates that best results
are obtained in mini-trials of cases involving complex questions
of mixed law and fact (e.g., patent, products liability, contract, anti-
trust, unfair competition)-the kinds of cases in which litigation
is often intractable and costly. For example, the mini-trial seems
well-suited to resolving an antitrust case where the stumbling block
to settlement is the scope and definition of the relevant market;
an unfair competition case where the crucial issue is the propriety
of certain disputed business practices; a products liability case
where the issue is whether a specially built component part met
the required standard of quality; or a contract case where the issues
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are whether the terms of the contract were fulfilled or nonfulfill-
ment was excusable.
By contrast, where a case turns solely on legal issues, traditional
summary judgment procedures are likely to provide a better means
of resolution. In addition, where a case turns primarily on factual
disputes involving credibility, the mini-trial may not be any more
effective in resolving the case than traditional settlement negotia-
tions or arbitration unless the witness whose credibility is in issue
appears at the mini-trial to tell his or her story and to be confronted
by the other side. The flexibility of the mini-trial enables the par-
ties to tailor the process to the issues in the case. For instance,
where the factual disputes are technical, requiring expert analysis
and promising a battle of the experts at trial, a modified mini-trial
involving a neutral expert can be employed. If, for example, the
performance of a product is at issue, ajoint testing procedure car-
ried out by experts for each side and a neutral expert might well
provide sufficient data to foster a settlement either before or after
a mini-trial. Or, in an antitrust case that turns on complex economic
analysis, the parties might agree to appoint an expert to under-
take this analysis early in the litigation. The expert's findings,
which could be reported at a mini-trial and/or admissible at trial,
will at least serve to narrow the issues in the case, and may be a
substantial additional spur to settlement.
Parties. The motivations and relationship of the parties will have
a substantial impact on the possibilities of successfully initiating
and implementing a mini-trial. Where the litigation is brought or
resisted for tactical reasons rather than out of a good faith sense
of a wrong suffered or an accusation wrongly made, a mini-trial
is unlikely to succeed. Similarly, where delay greatly favors one
side over another, a mini-trial probably cannot be initiated. On the
other hand, a long-term relationship between the parties will in-
crease their motivation to conduct a mini-trial.
Motivating influences that might make a mini-trial attractive to
management, in-house counsel, or retained lawyers include: (1)
business uncertainty caused by the litigation, such as in a patent
infringement case where the existence of the dispute casts a
shadow over new product development; (2) a rapidly approaching
deadline that operates like a short fuse to a potential bomb (often
this deadline is a trial date); (3) accumulating costs of litigation,
especially as they are projected for the entire trial; (4) internal cor-
porate politics, such as a desire to shift or focus responsibility for
the outcome of the litigation; and (5) a sense that the parties are
19861 243
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
just not successfully presenting their cases across to the other
side-that someone is simply mistaken about the likely outcome
if the case goes to trial.
Motivation is a complex issue, however. The five factors men-
tioned above sometimes operate in contrary or contradictory ways.
There is no hornbook approach. Sensitivity and timing are often
critical. The fact that the parties are adamant in their positions
does not necessarily preclude a mini-trial. The mini-trial has worked
even in cases in which communication between the parties had
broken down and compromise through traditional settlement
negotiations did not appear possible. What was crucial in such
cases was that the executives and lawyers on both sides, conscious
that there remained some remote possibility of creating an avenue
of communication, did not simply throw up their hands and begin
to gird for trial but were willing to risk using a novel procedure
of their own design. To the extent that some catharsis was necessary
to unblock the parties, the mini-trial provided an opportunity for
just enough animosity to exist, yet within a cooperative framework.
The information exchange portion of the mini-trial permitted the
negotiations to be refocused on the merits of the dispute, and the
involvement of problem-solving businesspersons who were "above
the fray" increased the chances of finding a "win/win" integra-
tive solution.
Costs. Mini-trials vary in cost, depending on the amount of
preparation required, the duration of the mini-trial, and whether
a neutral advisor is used. Even the most elaborate mini-trials ap-
pear, however, to cost less than one to three months' worth of the
legal fees incurred in moderately active litigation. Moreover, most
of the parties who have engaged in mini-trials report that even if
the case does not settle after the mini-trial, very little of the money
spent is wasted. This is because the mini-trial forces each side to
rigorously organize the mass of facts and legal arguments that have
been gathered over many years of discovery and legal maneuver-
ing, just as they will have to do to prepare the case for trial. Also,
the introductory statements that have to be written and exchanged
prior to the mini-trial are short versions of what might ultimately
be submitted as trial briefs. The procedure demands preparation
by counsel and experts that will be directly useful at trial if the
case does not settle.
The only mini-trial expenditures not related to activities that
would be incurred in any case for trial, and thus lost if the mini-
trial does not lead to a settlement, are those relating to the negotia-
tions concerning the mini-trial's protocol, and those resulting from
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the time spent at the mini-trial itself. One party to a mini-trial of
a large case estimated that these amounted to twenty-five percent
of total mini-trial expenditures, and that total costs to judgment
would have been approximately ten times greater.6 In that case,
because management considered that it was risking a relatively
small amount to avoid an otherwise certain expenditure of a great
deal more, it viewed the investment as well worth the risk.
Because of the necessity for organizing the case in a short time,
connections between relevant facts, and between facts and legal
theories that might not otherwise be made until pretrial or trial,
are made significantly earlier. If the litigation continues, this fosters
more focused discovery and pretrial preparation. In sum, even if
a mini-trial does not settle the dispute, the time spent by counsel
in intensive preparation may be worth significantly more to the
client than the same amount of time spent less focused during the
long pretrial phase of the case.
Mini-trials are now being used in almost every kind of case in
which a corporation could be involved-contract, UCC, securities,
land sales, personal injury, government contract, oil and gas sales,
patent, trademark, employment, etc. Information on mini-trial ex-
periences is available from organizations which specialize in their
design and implementation, such as EnDispute, Inc., or which
serve a clearinghouse, educational, and facilitative role, such as
the Center for Public Resources.
ii. Summary Jury Trial
The summary jury trial, developed by Federal District Judge
Thomas Lambros, Northern District of Ohio, seeks to encourage
settlements by assisting parties injury cases to evaluate realistically
the strengths and weaknesses of their position. In essence, the
summary jury trial is an adaptation of the mini-trial for jury cases
in which the parties want more direct information about likely jury
reaction. In the summary jury trial, the lawyers present short
(generally one to two hours) summaries of their case to a mock
jury chosen from the regular venire. The jury deliberates for an
hour or less and returns a consensus verdict responsive to inter-
6. The case reported was one of the very first mini-trials. Considerable time
was consumed working out the details of the mini-trial procedure. These costs
have been greatly reduced in subsequent mini-trials which have borrowed from
the earlier mini-trials. Green, CPR Legal Program Mini-Trial Handbook, in COR-
PORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT I (Center for Public Resources ed. 1982) includes in-
structions on how to do a mini-trial together with boilerplate mini-trial agreements
and forms.
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rogatories on liability and damages. The lawyers may then ques-
tion the jury about their verdict and deliberations (Lambros and
Shunk, 1980).
A study of this process by the Federal Judicial Center reached
the tentative conclusion "that summary jury trial worked well in
settling cases that might have gone on to full trials had they not
been assigned to such a procedure" (JACOUBOVITCH & MOORE 7).
Subsequent analysis has shown that of over eighty cases that were
assigned to summary jury trial, more than forty percent settled
prior to the summary jury trial and less than three percent went
to full trial (LAMBROS 472-473; BEDLIN & NEJELSKI 25). This data,
however, is subject to the same criticism that may be made about
many other studies of alternatives: the lack of a control group of
similar cases makes it impossible to draw valid conclusions about
the effect of the process on the settlement rate. Nonetheless, the
Federal Judicial Center study reports that a number of the attorneys
surveyed believe that assignment of cases to summary jury trial
provides a greater impetus to settle than do other pretrial pro-
ceedings (JACOUBOVITCH & MOORE 31).
In September 1984, the Judicial Conference of the United States
endorsed the experimental use of summary jury trials as poten-
tially effective means of promoting the fair and equitable settle-
ment of civil jury cases likely to be lengthy. In passing this resolu-
tion, the Judicial Conference rejected a suggestion that the sum-
mary jury trial be employed only where the parties voluntarily
agreed to it (ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, Judical Con-
ference 3).
iii. Neutral-Expert Fact-Finding
Many corporate disputes involve complex technical or economic
issues. Cases that turn on such facts may be difficult to settle
because of widely different assessments by the parties of how that
issue will be decided at trial. These assessments may be fueled by
disparate expert opinions on the issue. In such a situation, the ap-
pointment of a neutral expert to evaluate the key issue may im-
prove the chances for settlement.
This category of cases includes patent litigation where, for ex-
ample, the infringement and validity of a patent on a computer-
based algorithmic model or on a life form is at issue; commercial
cases where conformance of a product, say an electronic compo-
nent, to the specifications of a contract or standards of the industry
is at issue; construction cases where, for example, the cause of the
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collapse of a bridge is at issue; antitrust cases where the scope of
the relevant market and the defendant's control of that market are
at issue; and securities cases where the issue is whether the defen-
dant's accounting practices and other actions amounted to viola-
tions of the securities laws. It also includes environmental disputes
where the issues may include the actual level of pollution, the short-
and long-term health effects of such contamination, and the costs
of remedying the situation; medical malpractice; and toxic tort,
product liability personal injury cases in which the issues are
whether a particular product is capable of causing certain types
of harm, and whether that harm was caused by the product in a
specific instance. Utility rate-making cases and other ad-
ministrative appeals fall within this category. This is not an ex-
clusive list of cases that fit the generic description; these types of
cases make up an increasing percentage of the workload of federal
and state courts.
Several factors set such disputes apart from other forms of legal
combat. First, their resolution usually requires appraisal of data
and analysis of information outside the ken of most people's every-
day experience. Indeed, in many cases the dispute turns on an issue
that only a person with highly specialized and advanced training
or experience can understand. Second, in these cases the "truth"
concerning a key issue, such as the degree of harm likely to be
caused over an extended period by a contaminant, may itself be
in a state of flux or nearly impossible to determine without years
of empirical investigation. This may require that any decision be
made under conditions of uncertainty that are much greater or are
qualitatively different than those faced in other kinds of litigation.
Third, development and presentation of proof on scientific issues
is likely to be enormously difficult, time-consuming, and expen-
sive and apt to exacerbate the inherent deficiencies and oppor-
tunities for abuse present in the adversarial process generally.
Fourth, the scientists, engineers, or other experts who will be called
to testify on the issues in dispute live in their own cultures and
bring their own languages, values, and modes of thought with
them. This makes communications between such witnesses,
lawyers, judge, and jury difficult (SAKs &VAN DUIZEND 4-9, 92-96).
Finally, the experts called by the parties to testify are likely to be
carefully selected and prepared to present only the testimony most
favorable to the party that called them. This means that in most
cases, the fact-finder will be faced with conflicting expert opinion
and technical evidence that by definition was beyond the
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understanding of the fact-finder in the first place.
There is a particularly pressing need to develop an approach to
the resolution of cases raising complex scientific, sociological,
technical, economic, and business issues that eliminates or reduces
the deficiencies and abuses of the present system. Increased use
of neutral experts is one such approach. The neutral expert can
promote accurate fact-finding by providing an objective and im-
partial assessment of the facts, often from a person of higher caliber
than is available on a partisan basis to the parties. The neutral ex-
pert can also serve as a disincentive to strategic manipulation of
the litigation process and, most important, promote fast, fair, and
efficient settlement.
Since the adoption of the federal rules in 1975, Rule 706, of the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) is the most likely mechanism for
appointment by the court of a neutral expert.7 Rule 706, however,
is not the only source of authority under which a federal court can
appoint a neutral expert in civil cases. Under Rule 53 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the court can appoint a master "to
report... upon particular issues or to do or perform particular acts
or to receive and report evidence.... "References to masters are
limited by the rule to situations in which "exceptional conditions
require it" (nonjury cases) or only "when the issues are com-
plicated" (jury cases). The "exceptional" case requirement has
limited the number of cases in which masters have been appointed,
but in the cases in which they have been appointed, masters have
exercised extraordinary powers over pretrial and trial-stage pro-
ceedings. In addition to Rule 53, in appointing masters and experts,
7. Rule 706 states in pertinent part:
Rule 706. Court Appointed Experts
(a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be ap-
pointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may
appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint
expert witnesses of its own selection .... A witness so appointed shall ad-
vise the parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any
party; and he may be called to testify by the court or any party. He shall
be subject to cross-examination by each party, including a party calling him
as a witness. ...
(c) Disclosure of appointment. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court appointed the ex-
pert witness.
(d) Parties' experts of own selection. Nothing in this rule limits the parties
in calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
FED. R. EVID. 706.
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federal courts have relied on their "inherent authority" over the
administration of justice and the consent of the parties.
The characteristics of Rule 706 that make it particularly suitable
as an alternative dispute resolution device and inquisitorial adjunct
to the adversarial trial system include:
(1) It does not require the agreement of the parties. The court
may appoint an expert on its own motion or at the request
of one party.
(2) It provides for participation of the parties in the selection
of the expert and in the forming of instructions. The court
"may" appoint any expert witnesses agreed on by the parties
or of its own selections. The expert is informed of his duties
in writing by the court or at a conference in which the par-
ties "shall have opportunity to participate."
(3) The expert advises the parties of his findings. This presents
an opportunity for the expert to play a mediation/concilia-
tion role. The expert's deposition may also be taken by any
party.
(4) The procedure is coercive but nonbinding. The expert's opi-
nion is admissible as the opinion of a neutral expert but it
is not conclusive. Jury trial rights are preserved. Cross-
examination and the calling of retained experts is permit-
ted, but the court may tell the jury that the expert was court
appointed.
(5) The expert is entitled to "reasonable compensation" as set
by the court. Costs are apportioned in the court's discretion,
and may be taxable to the parties as other litigation costs.
(6) Appointment at any phase of the proceeding is allowed.
Neutral expertise similar to that provided by a Rule 706 court-
appointed neutral expert can be applied to complex disputes in
other ways also. For example, parties can agree privately, outside
the litigation process, to retain a neutral expert to advise them on
the complex issues in dispute. Disputants could agree to hire a
neutral expert even prior to commencement of litigation. There
do not appear to be any barriers that would prevent a privately
appointed neutral expert from performing any of the functions
specified in Rule 706, such as conducting research, advising the
parties of findings, giving a deposition, and testifying in court. The
only limitation appears to be that the expert would not be iden-
tified to the jury as court-appointed. The parties could agree, how-
ever, to disclose to the jury that the expert was jointly selected
and retained.
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A privately appointed neutral expert may be able to do much
more than an expert appointed under FRE 706. For example, if
the parties agree, the privately-appointed expert could conduct a
far ranging investigation involving examination of documents, per-
sons and things, experiments, and testing. The authority of the
Rule 706 expert to conduct such discovery is unclear. Carrying
this procedure to its logical conclusion, the parties could agree to
submit the dispute to a neutral expert for binding resolution. This,
of course, is arbitration or reference under a statute or rule pro-
viding for a general order of reference (rent-a-judge). Private refer-
ral of a dispute to a neutral expert for a nonbinding opinion or
assistance is a form of mediation or mini-trial, depending on the
process and the neutral expert's function. The important distinc-
tions between these other forms of neutral assistance and Rule 706
are that the parties' consent is required to utilize them, and their
purposes do not include neutral fact-finding for trial presentation.
To understand how the appointment of a neutral expert will af-
fect the settlement process, it is necessary to understand how
litigants decide to settle cases. Many factors influence the decision
whether and when to settle a dispute. These include "rational"
factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the dispute, such as the likely out-
come and the litigants' resources, needs, aversion to risk, and stay-
ing power. They also include nonrational factors such at the
litigants' emotional condition.
Assuming for purposes of analysis, however, that litigants are
rational decisionmakers with relatively equivalent resources,
needs, staying power, and aversion to risk, they will not settle when
the stakes are significant and where they hold widely divergent
views of likely trial outcomes. In complex scientific and technical
cases, disparity in the parties' estimates of the plaintiffs probability
of success are usually caused by sincere and strongly held
divergent views on how a crucial technical issue will be decided.
Often each side's high estimate of its probability of success is based
principally on the opinions and assurances it has received from
its experts. Unless some additional information is provided to the
parties that causes them to revaluate their experts' confidence in
their opinion or the parties' confidence in their experts' opinions,
the disparity between the parties' estimates of success will pre-
vent settlement.
In some cases, the most effective piece of additional information
that might cause one or both parties to modify their estimate of
their probability of success is the opinion of a neutral expert on
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a key technical issue. Indeed, the mere possibility that a court-
appointed neutral expert will testify at trial may be enough to cause
the parties to reassess their pretrial estimates of success.
Appointment of a neutral expert may have several other settle-
ment-inducing side-effects. Although Rule 706 does not specify how
the expert shall conduct an inquiry and formulate his opinions,
contact between the expert and the parties is not prohibited and,
except where the court directs that all communication between
the expert and the parties pass through the court, is likely to occur.
In "instructing" the expert as to duties, the court, certainly with
the consent of the parties and possibly even without their consent,
may instruct the expert to inspect people, places, and things. This
may well include discussions with the parties through their lawyers
and experts. These discussions may take a variety of forms, from
highly unstructured and informal ex parte discussions to a highly
structured, on-the-record hearing. Indeed, with the cooperation of
the parties the neutral expert can conduct a thorough inquest into
the subject matter in dispute. Departing from the "pure" neutral-
expert role in this manner, during the course of investigations there
may be many opportunities for the neutral expert to assume a
mediational role between the adversaries' own experts. The expert
may assume some or all of the functions that other kinds of third-
party intervenors to a dispute commonly undertake. While this
creates danger for an inexperienced or overly ambitious neutral
expert, it also provides significant dispute resolution opportunities.
In formulating instructions to the neutral expert, the court and par-
ties should clearly delineate the expert's functions, duties, and
range of activities. In this way the court can minimize the danger
that the neutral expert's role will be overstepped, thereby destroy-
ing effectiveness, while at the same time maximizing the possi-
bilities that exist for successful third-party dispute resolution inter-
vention.
If neutral experts are such a readily available palliative to the
excesses of adversariness in complex cases, why are they not used
more often? The underutilization of neutral experts may be the
result of ingrained conceptions about the adjudicatory process and
unease on the part ofjudges and lawyers who believe that the intro-
duction of neutral experts will threaten their roles in this process.
The most commonly expressed criticism of the use of neutral
experts is that they will influence the jury "excessively." It is
unclear what "excessively" means in this context. If the case in-
volves subject matter on which expert testimony is admissible,
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then expert testimony should influence the jury. Further, when
there is a clash of expert testimony from the parties' experts, the
opinion of a nonpartisan expert should receive important con-
sideration from the jury because it is at least free from the adver-
sarial bias that affects the parties' experts. "Excessive influence"
in this context must mean "giving the evidence more weight than
it deserves to be given," but, as explained above, the procedures
of Rule 706 and the traditional tools of the adversary process are
available to control the impact the neutral expert's testimony will
have on the jury. There is no evidence that these procedures are
insufficient to limit the impact of neutral expert testimony to its
proper level.
What judges (and lawyers) may really be concerned about is the
power that they fear the neutral expert will take away from them.
In our adversarial system, the judge and parties control the adver-
sary process. There is only one neutral in the courtroom and that
neutral is the judge. The only experts in the courtroom are leashed
to the parties' lawyers. Bringing a neutral expert into the process
destroys the judge's monopoly on neutrality and the parties' con-
trol of the expert information and opinion in the case. But in the
face of strong evidence that the lawyers' lock on the levers of the
adversary process regarding expert testimony can retard accurate
fact-finding and hinder settlement, some adjustments seem appro-
priate. The traditional roles of judges and lawyers should give way
slightly if adjustments will rationalize the adjudicatory process and
make it fairer and more efficient.
iv. Ombudsman.
The ombudsman seeks to resolve grievances wholly outside the
judicial system by performing a mixture of mediatory and inves-
tigatory functions. In the classic Scandinavian model, the ombuds-
man is a public official appointed to hear citizen complaints and
conduct independent fact-finding investigations with the goal of
correcting abuses of public administration. While extensively used
in Canada, according to Johnson, Kantor and Schwartz only four
states and a handful of localities have established public ombuds-
men, in spite of the promulgation in 1974 by the American Bar
Association of a Model Ombudsman Statute for State Governments
(JOHNSON, KANTOR, & SCHWARTZ 58-65). However, in recent years,
many nonunion employers, spurred by a variety of motives-the
desire to increase employee satisfaction; to avoid unionization; to
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discourage litigation based on alleged discrimination or wrongful
discharge-have adopted their own internal dispute resolution pro-
cedures, separate and distinct from traditional "chain of com-
mand" procedures. While some of these new procedures are limited
to discrimination complaints and others are available only to
employees paid by the hour, excluding higher-level salaried per-
sonnel, about one-third of all nonunion employers have a broadly
based dispute resolution procedure that is open to all employees
for any type of complaint (ROWE & BAKER).
In order to encourage employees to use these procedures, and
to increase their objectivity, some companies have designated
inhouse "neutrals" who investigate complaints, mediate among
disputing parties, and make recommendations to management.
These neutrals typically do not have the power to reverse a man-
agement decision. Their model is not that of the arbitrator, but
rather that of the mediator or the ombudsman (ROWE).
The growth of internal procedures to deal with intra-institutional
disputes has not been limited to employer-employee disputes.
Other institutions have also implemented internal dispute resolu-
tion procedures in an effort to both reduce the frequency of litiga-
tion and to improve the quality of institutional life. Among the insti-
tutions that have adopted such procedures are high schools, col-
leges, and universities, as well as a variety of institutions in which
people are confined-hospitals, nursing homes, mental institutions,
and prisons. At times, an internal dispute resolution procedure has
been legislatively imposed. For example, the Older Americans Act
of 1981 provides that each state, in order to receive grants for state
and community programs on aging, must provide for the establish-
ment of an ombudsman program for all older individuals residing
in long-term care facilities. Another example of legislation bear-
ing on internal dispute resolution procedures is the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, which authorized the
Attorney General to develop minimum standards for prison dispute
resolution procedures. Under that Act, federal courts may continue
cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by prisoners for a period of up
to 90 days in order to allow exhaustion of the prison dispute resolu-
tion procedure, if that procedure complies with the standards pro-
mulgated by the Attorney General.
Wholly apart from legislative requirements, prisons have been
active in the development of internal dispute resolution procedures,
because prison administrators have sought satisfactory means of
responding to prisoner complaints before they result in litigation,
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increased tension, and violence. One of the earliest prison dispute
resolution procedures was that established in 1973 by the Cali-
fornia Youth Authority (KEATING & KOLZE).
A central characteristic of both the employer-employee and the
prison-inmate relationship is the existence of a substantial power
disparity between the institution and the individual involved in
a dispute with it. To be sure, this power disparity is not the same
in all institutions. Employees, because of their ability to litigate
under antidiscrimination statutes and common law wrongful
discharge principles, as well as their freedom to unionize and to
terminate the employment relationship, have considerably more
power vis-a-vis their employer than do prison inmates vis 4-vis the
prison. The power of students relative to schools, colleges, and uni-
versities is somewhere between that of employees and that of prison
inmates. Nonetheless, in each of these relationships there is a sub-
stantial power disparity between the individual and the institu-
tion, and this disparity gives rise to a number of issues, such as
whether a dispute-resolver who is funded by, and exists at the suf-
ferance of, a powerful institution can be neutral or fair in disputes
between the institution and a less powerful individual who is depen-
dent on that institution. If the dispute-resolver does remain fair,
will the institution permit the dispute resolution process to sur-
vive? Will the institutionally controlled dispute resolution process,
by redressing the more egregious excesses of the institution,
dissipate the will of the individuals involved to seek meaningful
structural change in their relationship with the institution, and
thus, in the long run, work against the interest of those individuals?
None of the internal grievance procedures utilizing the ombuds-
man/mediation model have been in existence long enough to pro.
vide definitive answers to these questions.
v. Settlement Special Masters
In large, complex cases, a court may appoint a special master
for the purpose of exploring or designing settlement options. Depen-
ding on the case, the special master may function as a mediator
or as the designer and administrator of an elaborate case manage-
ment and settlement plan. Special masters are provided for under
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; most states have
similar rules. But, until recently, perhaps because of hostility by
appellate courts to the overuse of masters," their use has been
8. See, e.g., La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
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limited to overseeing discovery in "exceptional cases" or in con-
ducting an accounting. Recently, courts have begun to appoint
special masters in complex cases, generally involving corporations,
explicitly for the purposes of facilitating settlement.
In the Ohio Asbestos Litigation in the Northern District of Ohio,
for example, the special masters developed a detailed case man-
agement plan designed to reduce the delay and costs associated
with trying multiple asbestos cases. They also created an in-
novative case evaluation and apportionment plan designed to facil-
itate mass settlement of asbestos cases. The settlement plan pro-
vided for the creation of a data base of all closed asbestos cases
in the district that would serve as the starting point for computer
assisted negotiation ("CAN") among the parties on the open cases
(LAMBROS, GREEN, & McGOVERN). After adoption of the plan by the
court, the special masters assisted in its implementation, and all
of the cases in the first eight clusters subject to the plan settled
before trial. With the support of the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution, the closed case analysis and computer assisted nego-
tiation portion of the plan is being further developed, applied to
additional cases in Ohio, and evaluated for potential use in other
contexts.
In another case, three months before scheduled trial, Federal
District Judge Weinstein, Eastern District of New York, appointed
three special masters in the Agent Orange class litigation, which
involved 2,400,000 class members and seven defendant com-
panies. Working as mediators, the special masters helped the par-
ties reach a last-minute $180 million settlement that avoided what
appeared to be an almost certain protracted trial (CENTER FOR
PUBLIC RESOURCES, CPR Legal Program 56-59).
In most cases, special masters are appointed with consent of the
parties. In other cases, they are not. These latter cases present the
question, not yet addressed by any court, whether appointment
of a special master for settlement purposes over the parties' objec-
tions is within the court's authority.
vi. Private Judging ("Rent-a-Judge")9
The nonbinding quality of the mini-trial is both one of its strengths
and weaknesses. In recent years, some California litigants in com-
plex commercial cases (and in other types of particularly nasty
disputes, such as divorce cases with large amounts of property at
9. This section is largely taken from Green, Avoiding the Legal Log Jam-
Private Justice, California Style, in CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 65 (Center
for Public Resources ed. 1982).
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stake) have availed themselves of a binding variation of the mini-
trial. This is the use of a private judge or "referee" pursuant to
the California general reference statute. 10
Dubbed by the popular press as "rent-a-judge," the reference pro-
cedure is similar in many respects to the mini-trial, but also dif-
ferent in certain important ways. Like the mini-trial, rent-a-judge
permits litigants to have their case heard privately and quickly by
a third party of their own choosing. Also like the mini-trial, rent-
a-judge has established such an impressive track record in the cases
in which it has been applied that it has attracted the enthusiastic
attention of lawyers, judges, and businessmen nationwide. Since
rent-a-judge may be more suitable than a mini-trial in certain types
of disputes, it is worth studying its characteristics and require-
ments and comparing them to those of its cousins: arbitration and
the mini-trial.
a. The California Reference Statute-How "Rent-a-Judge" Works
The essence of the California reference procedure is the provi-
sion which allows the court, "upon the agreement of the parties,"
to appoint anyone it deems qualified as "referee" to "try any or
all of the issues in an action. .. , whether of fact or of law, and to
report a finding and judgment thereon," or "to ascertain a fact
necessary to enable the court to determine an action." The par-
ties may stipulate to the choice of a single referee or up to three
referees. In certain specified cases, if the parties do not agree on
a referee, on the application of either party or on its own motion,
the court may appoint a special referee or referees of its choosing
"and against whom there is no legal objection" to determine an
account or report on a single fact. A legal objection may be based
on the referee's bias or interest, or, in environmental cases, "on
the ground that he is not technically qualified with respect to the
particular subject matter of the proceedings." In most cases in
which this device has been employed, however, and in the cases
that have most attracted the interest of corporate counsel seeking
a way out of crowded public courtrooms, the referee has been
appointed under the general reference provisions of Section 638
and the selection was by mutual agreement of the parties. Once
appointed, the referee has all the powers of a trial judge except the
contempt power and the power to appoint a referee.
10. All statutory references to the California general reference procedure are
to CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 638-45 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986).
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A case may be referred to a referee at any time, even prior to
the filing of the complaint, by the filing of a petition and proposed
order. In most cases, the referee is appointed after the answer and
any counter-claims have been filed. However, since the referee has
all the power of ajudge to hear and decide motions and discovery
matters, early appointment of a referee can greatly reduce the cost
of pretrial conflict.
The procedure at the trial before the referee may range from tradi-
tional court proceedings to the more informal procedures of arbitra-
tion. Witnesses are sworn, but, if the parties desire, the evidence
taken need not be reported or even recorded." The referee is obliged
to follow both substantive law and evidentiary rules, but (subject
to some limitations) the parties may agree to modify or disregard
most formal rules of procedure, evidence, and pleading. The par-
ties and referee may also decide by agreement the date of the "trial"
and specify the disputed issues to be tried.
The referee is directed to submit a written report to the appoint-
ing court within twenty days of the close of testimony. Generally,
this report consists of findings of fact and conclusions of law, that
must be stated separately. Apparently, detailed findings and con-
clusions may be dispensed with by agreement of the parties and
referee and only brief findings and conclusions reported-e.g.,
liability in a certain amount or nonliability. If the similar judge pro
tem process' 2 is used instead of the general reference statute,
findings may be waived altogether.
The California statute provides that "the finding of the referee...
upon the whole issue must stand as the finding of the court, and...
judgment may be entered thereon in the same manner as if the
action had been tried by the court." (Emphasis added). The Code
Commissioners Note to this section and several California Supreme
Court cases state that the finding of a general referee is "con-
clusive" and that mandamus lies to compel the court to enter judg-
ment on the report of a referee.' 3 Unlike arbitration, however,
appeal rights are preserved just as with any judgment. Costs,
including the referee's fee, are chargeable to the parties, although
the parties may by stipulation make whatever sharing arrange-
ment they desire.
11. See Chapman v. Gibson, 103 Cal. App. 2d 585, 229 P.2d 834 (1951).
12.See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21; Rule 224(a) of the California Rules of Court.
13. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Ellsworth, 42 Cal. 2d 719, 269 P.2d 3 (1954); Lewis
v. Grunberg, 205 Cal. 158, 270 P. 181 (1928).
2571986]
JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
b. Advantages of the General Reference
1. Selecting the Judge. When compared with traditional adjudi-
cation, several attractive aspects of the reference procedure stand
out. First and most importantly, in the reference procedure the
litigants choose the third party who will decide their dispute rather
than trusting to the luck of the draw in the assignment of a trial
judge. This can be of enormous importance in a complex commer-
cial case, a dispute involving difficult technical questions, or simply
a case involving a very large amount of money or a vital aspect
of a company's business. Parties are likely to attach greater
credibility to a decision handed down by a decisionmaker they had
some role in choosing. As the reference procedure is more widely
employed, it will be interesting to compare the rate of appeals taken
from referee judgments with those taken from traditional trial
judgments to test the hypothesis that reference judgments are more
accepted, and hence less often appealed by the parties. One would
expect fewer appeals from referees' judgments in any case, because
they represent a self-selected category of cases in which the
disputants have sought a quick resolution and, presumably, chosen
a "better" and hence less error-prone judge.
2. Speed and Convenience. Other major advantages the refer-
ence procedure has over traditional adjudication are speed and con-
venience. Parties trapped in traditional court litigation have vir-
tually no control over the timing of the trial or the scheduling of
hearing dates. In some large jurisdictions, such as Los Angeles
Superior Court and Suffolk County (Massachusetts) Superior Court,
the time between the filing of a complaint and commencement of
trial commonly runs four to five years, or more. It is a maxim that
"justice delayed is justice denied." Finding ingenious ways to
advance one's case on the calendar has now become an important
litigation tactic. Often, there is nothing counsel can do to break
out of this legal logjam but wait and hope that witnesses do not
die or forget or parties lose interest and give up. Nothing, that is,
except get the court to appoint a referee, hire a retired judge, and
go to trial whenever the parties are ready. With the reference pro-
cedure, the parties can schedule their trial at a place, date, and
time convenient to them and be certain of the arrangements. One
attorney who has participated in several reference procedures
claims, "it has saved 80% of the delays, 80% of the legal fees, and
80% of the aggravation" encountered in the courts.
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3. Flexibility. Another major advantage which the reference pro-
cedure has over adjudication is its flexible rules and procedures.
Parties who want the formality and procedures of a trial can have
them under the reference provisions-black-robed judge, paneled
courtroom, reporter, and all the "tosh." But, as with the mini-trial,
if the parties want, most procedural and evidentiary bets can be
called off. By stipulating to waive general rules designed for all
cases, the parties can design rules of evidence and procedures
which meet their specific needs. Revising the rules is not a revolu-
tionary idea, of course. It is, the essence of arbitration. And in tradi-
tional adjudication it is not unusual for all parties, and the court,
to agree to dispense with some of the trappings of due process. On
the other hand, the obligations of the referee to apply substantive
law and the availability of an appeal for errors of law sharply dis-
tinguish the reference procedure from arbitration.
4. Confidentiality. Another feature of the reference procedure
which attracts many disputants is its confidentiality. Once the mat-
ter is referred to the referee, nothing more need be reported or made
public except the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Apparently, even these may be waived by the parties. In the event
an appeal is taken after a reference of this sort, the parties will have
to stipulate to a record on appeal. According to those experienced
with the procedure, in practice this has not been a problem. In con-
trast, a regular trial is a completely public event. Anyone is free
to attend, including the parties' competitors; exhibits and
testimony are available to anyone who wants access to them. Even
a protective order may not be effective to preserve the confiden-
tiality of discovery materials. In cases involving trade secrets or
closely guarded methods of doing business that do not quite rise
to the level of trade secrets but which business understandably
regards as private, or in cases where the parties may be concerned
about bad publicity, confidentiality may be a sufficient reason for
parties to "go private."
5. Quick Decision. Another advantage of the reference procedure
over traditional litigation is the speed with which a decision is
rendered after the trial. Unfortunately, it is not unusual for there
to be a delay of many months between the close of a court-tried
case and a decision. Under the reference procedure, a decision is
expected within twenty days.
The assurance of a final, binding and appealable decision is a
major advantage of the reference procedure (over the mini-trial and
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other nonbinding processes). The quid pro quo for this, however,
is that the decision is imposed by a third party rather than designed
by the parties themselves. This has some important by-products.
For example, since the referee's decision is handed down by a
judicial figure and incorporated into a judgment, it is much more
likely to partake of the winner-take-all, money-based nature of most
common law judgments rather than the more flexible, creative and
mutually compensatory character of voluntary settlements.
The reference procedure also provides more flexibility in the form
of relief than does court adjudication. This is mostly a result of the
opportunities it provides for mediation, negotiation, and voluntary
settlement to occur prior to judgment. Of course, these opportu-
nities should not be understated. A reference proceeding conducted
by an experienced former judge or attorney sensitive to the media-
tional possibilities of his role provides the next best settlement
forum to a mini-trial. The main point is that the result of an adjudi-
cation before a referee is much more likely to resemble the result
of a traditional adjudication than the result of an arbitration,
negotiation, mediation, or mini-trial. Of course, this, and the right
of appeal, may be just what the parties want.
c. Rent-a-Judge Experiences
Actual experience with the binding reference procedure has been
primarily confined to California. The procedure has been on the
books in that state for over a hundred years, but apparently the
first time it was consciously used as an alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanism was in 1976. Since then it has been used in Los
Angeles County alone in 150-200 cases per year, most of which
were very large, time-consuming matters (CHRISTENSEN 102).
A typical example of the use of the reference procedure was a
breach of contract, defective product case involving a major auto-
mobile manufacturer, the designer, and the manufacturer of a com-
ponent part. Five suits and countersuits were filed when the prod-
uct allegedly failed and the auto manufacturer cancelled the con-
tracts. Unable to obtain a trial in the public courts, the parties had
a referee appointed. After fifteen days of trial, scheduled at the con-
venience of the parties and witnesses, a judgment was handed
down. Reportedly, even the losing party praised the process.
d. Criticisms of the Reference Procedure
With all of these advantages over traditional adjudication, what
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points can be made against expanded use of the reference pro-
cedure? Paradoxically, most criticism seems to be based precise-
ly on the assumption that adjudication by referee is better than
adjudication by the court.
1. "Rich Man's Justice." Critics claim that since the litigants
must pay the referee themselves, whereas the court system is
almost completely supported by taxes, the availability of private
judging creates two kinds of justice--"rich man's justice" and
"poor man's justice" (HARVARD LAW REVIEW).
This criticism is understandable but wrong. First of all, use by
some litigants of the reference process does not deprive any other
litigants of anything they now have. The quality ofjustice available
to everyone in the courts is not adversely affected by the diver-
sion of some cases to referees. On the contrary, removing complex
business disputes from the courts can only have a positive impact
on court calendars and improve access to justice for everyone else.
Indeed, some believe that the commercial disputes between private
litigants which are the staple of the reference process should not
be allowed in court at all. These cases, some critics claim, unfairly
consume the scarce judicial resources of the court system at the
expense of criminal defendants and individuals claimants awaiting
trial (BIRD). Under this view, the public dispute resolution system
should be reserved for disputes in which the public has a more
substantial interest-criminal cases, civil rights cases, and indi-
vidual grievances that require the leverage of the state to resolve.
Although this is an extreme view, in some ways the present
system reflects it. Speedy trial provisions for criminal cases and
priority treatment for other types of cases involving public law
issues seek to assure greater access to the courts for these disputes
at th6 expense of commercial litigants. But it pushes the point too
far to claim that the public has no interest in the efficient and fair
resolution of private commercial disputes or that such disputants
do not have a right of access to the public system when necessary.
Guaranteeing a right of access is different, however, from say-
ing that commercial disputants must adjudicate their disputes in
court even though they believe that they have found a better way
in a better forum. After all, resolution of commercial litigation,
whether by negotiation between the principals alone, or by their
agreement to seek a decision from a referee, in some respects is
simply the continuation of the business dealings that led up to the
dispute in the first place. Viewed in this light, why should those
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who wish to employ the services of a referee and who are willing
to pay what amounts to a "user's fee" for the services of the referee
be denied that option? Even taxpayers benefit by the private par-
ties' decision to use the reference process-the state saves the cost
of the judge and all the other court personnel. Thus, to the extent
use of referees works a reallocation of resources, the reallocation,
in economists terms, is "Pareto-superior." In everyday language,
this means that it "makes no one worse off and at least one per-
son better off."
In addition, the underlying assumptions of the "rich-man's
justice" criticism are questionable. Experience indicates that it is
only the wealthy who can afford justice as presently dispensed by
the public system and the private bar. Although disputants using
the reference procedure must pay the referee's salary while they
would receive the services of a judge at no cost, in most cases they
will save so much in reduced delay, inconvenience, disruption, and
unnecessary formality to make the reference procedure more than
pay for itself. In truth, too often it is the public justice system that
dispenses "rich-man's justice," and this is what reference
disputants seek to avoid.
A more valid concern along these same lines is that if private
judging becomes commonplace for businesses, it could result in
a withdrawal from the public system of powerful, private interests.
This could drain off resources necessary for reform and improve-
ment of the courts. This is very unlikely to happen. No matter how
attractive reference and mini-trials become, even the most powerful
and resourceful classes of society will still have occasion to resort
to the public system. All alternative dispute resolution mechanisms
depend on a strong, open court system for their existence. And
even the most powerful companies and individuals cannot prevent
themselves from being summoned into court and kept there by
a complainant. Reference takes two to tango and in many cases
there will be one party which, for a variety of reasons, does not
want to dance.
2. Secrecy. Another criticism lodged against the reference pro-
cess relates to its confidentiality. "Secret trials" offend our notion
of open government and public courts. This is a serious considera-
tion. Secrecy may offend the public's "first amendment right to
know" about the conduct of government, including the courts. The
parties to these disputes would deny that there is any public interest
protected by the first amendment in knowing the details of their
business disputes and how they are resolved. To them, the dispute
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is the continuation of a private transaction that went awry. They
would contend that straightening out the transaction need not be
any more public than the making of it.
The weak point in this reasoning is that at least one of the par-
ties to the dispute has invoked the assistance of a public agency
(the court), and both have then agreed to employ an officially sanc-
tioned dispute resolution procedure. The parties' claim to privacy
is more convincing when they have resolved their dispute without
the aid of the court through negotiation or a mini-trial. But, under
the reference procedure, the parties obtain ajudgment enforceable
with all the power of the state that is normally available to vic-
torious litigants. If the parties want the imprimatur and power of
ajudgment, the critics of privacy would say, the trade-off is open-
ness. When one considers the possible antitrust implications of a
referee-ordered judgment, this argument has some force. However,
it does not account for the fact that parties to a lawsuit generally
can settle a case themselves privately and ask the court to enter
a judgment incorporating the terms of the settlement. If there is
no right of access to settlement negotiations in this situation, why
need there be in the reference?
vii. Industry-wide Self-regulatory Dispute Resolution
Another strategy for avoiding or resolving institutional litigation
is the development of specialized dispute resolution courts and pro-
cesses within clearly defined industries or institutions. Examples
of such programs include the American Stock Exchange's program
for security disputes, the dispute resolution program of the Coun-
cil of Better Business Bureau's Advertising Division, and insurance
industry arbitration. (GREEN, Avoiding the Legal Log Jam 339).
These programs tend to share certain characteristics. First, they
generally provide for speedy arbitration before industry experts.
Within the insurance industry, Insurance Arbitration Forums are
available to resolve quickly intercompany coverage disputes. Also,
virtually all re-insurance treaties contain arbitration clauses requir-
ing arbitration before panels composed of insurance executives.
Within the securities industry, arbitration before an exchange panel
is mandatory for member companies and optional to customers.
For internal disputes, these panels are composed exclusively of
industry experts. If customers are involved, they contain public
representatives who are also experts. The BBB's National Adver-
tising Division's trial boards are also composed of career profes-
sionals who investigate and try to resolve misleading advertising
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claims. They employ adjudication, fact-finding, and mediation.
Another common feature of these programs is that they are
custom-designed for relatively self-contained industries in which
failure to abide by the procedure can result in banishment from
the industry association or marketplace. This is a sufficiently severe
sanction to assure compliance. Another interesting attribute com-
mon to each of these industry-wide dispute resolution mechanisms
is that virtually no discovery is permitted except perhaps for the
voluntary exchange of documents.
Industry members find these procedures attractive because they
allow them to have their disputes heard by an expert in their
business. These industries employ a particular business termi-
nology and operate within their own standards of conduct and with
their own business expectations. Arbitration before a neutral deci-
sion maker familiar with the terminology and the standards of con-
duct of the business saves time and money and assures that reason-
able business expectations will be understood.
The factors that make these procedures work in some industries
may also define the limits of their effectiveness. They are most
likely to be effective where: (1) there is some degree of consensus
among the parties over the rules of the game; (2) the disputes that
arise are amenable to resolution by industry experts; (3) speedy
resolution of the disputes is important; and (4) there is a sufficiently
large number of disputes among industry members to warrant the
establishment and maintenance of specialized procedures (GREEN,
Avoiding the Legal Log Jam).
viii. Mediation
Mediation has been increasingly used by institutions to arrive
at negotiated rather than adjudicated resolutions of organizational
disputes. An example of a corporate mediation program to handle
consumer disputes is The Ford Motor Company's Consumer Ap-
peals Board (SMITH 219). Begun in 1977, the third party media-
tion program provides Ford customers with an opportunity to have
their service complaints judged by an independent authority
without going through costly and time-consuming court action.
Under this program, any owner of a Ford whose dealer is in a state
represented in the program, and who has a service complaint, can
request review of the problem by a five member board composed
of three consumer and two company representatives. Presentations
are generally in writing, but oral arguments may be made by in-
vitation. Ford and its dealers are bound by the decisions of the
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Board, but customers are not and remain free to go to court if they
are dissatisfied with the decision. Only service related complaints
that are not in litigation may be brought to the Board.
According to Smith, out of 5,360 cases opened, 1,417 (26%) were
resolved to the customer's satisfaction prior to board action. Of the
3,346 cases decided by the Board, 1,313 (39%) resulted in full or
partial adjustment to customers. The customers' complaint was
denied in 1,527 (46%) of the cases, and previously offered ad-
justments were ratified in the remaining 15% of the cases. In total,
the customer was offered some kind of assistance in 68% of the
cases closed either prior to or following board action. Of those
customers who failed to win any relief from the mediation board,
only twenty-three subsequently went on to seek relief in court.
Smith states that the mediation program has the benefits of pro-
viding an alternative to litigation, thus leading to savings for all
parties and an improvement in Ford's relations with the public and
private consumer protection organizations. It also provides Ford
with a positive marketing tool that can influence buying considera-
tions. Chrysler and General Motors have established similar
programs.
Institutional mediation of environmental disputes has received
widespread attention in recent years. A leading example is the 1982
mediated solution to the proposed Storm King Mountain Con-
solidated Edison Pumped-Storage Plant (TRAIN 163). This dispute
was in litigation for fifteen years. Numerous governmental agencies
and public interest groups were involved and approval of any agree-
ment was needed from a variety of regulatory bodies at the federal,
state, and local levels. The Storm King mediation consumed four-
teen months during which twenty meetings of principals and a
number of technical meetings designed primarily to narrow the
differences among the scientists occurred. Russell Train, the former
administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, mediated
the conflict.
Train cautions against attempting to deduce a formal set of rules
from the Storm King mediation that would permit replication of
the experience in other circumstances. Specifically, he points to
the fact that litigation and administrative proceedings had dragged
on for years and doubtless would have continued for more years
as an important factor in successfully resolving the case. He also
points to the necessity of there being a reasonable balance of power
among the parties and room for granting major concessions on both
sides. As Train points out, when governmental agencies are in-
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volved, this is not always the case. In the Storm King case, long
after the utilities and citizen environmental groups had reached
a basis for settlement, the EPA refused to go along.
ix. Med-Arb
A variant on mediation that is sometimes applied to intercor-
porate disputes uses mediation followed by an arbitration process
directed by the mediator. Any issues the parties have been unable
to settle by agreement are thus resolved. An example of a case in
which this process was successfully used involved the division of
an architectural firm into two separate firms. The two new entities
agreed to have a mediator help them resolve financial and occu-
pancy differences as far as he could, and then to decide definitively
whatever they could not resolve.
This process, dubbed "med-arb," has two main advantages.
First, it achieves voluntary resolution of as many issues as possi-
ble. As in all of the nonbinding processes, this permits a wider range
of solutions to the dispute, leads to greater party satisfaction with
the result, and hence improves the chances that the result will be
accepted and implemented without further costly disputes. Second,
if issues must be arbitrated the mediator already will be familiar
with the parties, facts, legal issues, and contentions. Armed with
this knowledge, the mediator turned arbitrator should be able to
make a decision quicker and at less expense to the parties than
could a new third party brought in to arbitrate.
There are also certain dangers associated with the combination
of the roles of mediator and arbitrator in one person. Professor
Fuller criticized med-arb on the grounds that if the arbitrator's
efforts at mediation fail and there must be an arbitrated decision
of the case, the arbitrator will have fatally compromised the in-
tegrity of the adjudicative role. (FULLER, Collective Bargaining).
Fuller argues that the arbitrator is likely to have acquired infor-
mation in attempting to bring about a settlement that should have
no bearing on a decision as an adjudicator. If the arbitrator fails
to mediate a settlement, it will be difficult to block this informa-
tion out in reaching a decision; consequently, it will be even more
difficult for the parties to believe that this has been done. 14
14. Tripartite arbitration, in which one "arbitrator" appointed by each party
serves together with a neutral arbitrator as a board of arbitration, is sometimes
used in an effort to combine elements of both arbitration and mediation. However,
Fuller Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 3 rejects that
process also, as a distortion of both arbitration and mediation. Fuller's conclu-
sion is that there is no need for the arbitrator to abandon a purely adjudicative
role, even in those cases that appear most difficult for adjudication, because there
exists a variety of methods by which such cases can be resolved while keeping
the arbitrator's role within the strictest limits of judicial propriety.
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In an effort to retain the advantages of the med-arb process, in-
cluding the inducement to settle that is generated by the ar-
bitrator's hints as to the likely outcome if the case is not settled,
while avoiding the confusion of roles that Fuller criticizes, Pro-
fessors Goldberg and Brett designed a dispute resolution procedure
in which a neutral party first acts as a mediator, then as an ad-
visory arbitrator (GOLDBERG; GOLDBERG & BRETT). The neutral
party is empowered to advise the disputing parties as to the likely
outcome if they go to arbitration, but not to arbitrate the dispute.
If the parties cannot resolve their differences in the first phase of
this process, they must then go to another person for final and
binding arbitration.
Reporting on the success of this med-arb program to a 1985 New
York University Conference on Labor (GOLDBERG, GREEN, & SANDER
262), Professor Goldberg stated:
In order to test the mediation procedure, we began in November, 1980
what was at that time intended to be a six-month experiment in grievance
mediation in the bituminous coal industry. Well, the six months has
stretched out to three and one half years, we have mediated 458 griev-
ances in the coal industry, and another thirty-six in other industries
(USWA, IAM, IBEW, ATU). The results have been as follows:
Of the 494 cases which have been to mediation, 415, or eighty-four per-
cent have been finally resolved without resort to arbitration. Approxi-
mately fifty per cent of the settlements have been compromises, in which
each side walked away with something. Another twenty-five per cent have
been non-compromise settlements-that is, either the company granted
the grievance in its entirety or the union withdrew the grievance in its
entirety. In about twenty-five per cent of the grievances, the mediator has
given an advisory opinion. Approximately half of those advisory opinions
have been accepted and the other half have gone to arbitration. Of those
which have gone to arbitration, the arbitrator's award has been predicted
in seventy-nine percent of the cases.
We have, in fact, been able to mediate an average of three grievances
per day. The cost of mediation has averaged $200 per grievance, $100
per party. This does not include travel expenses, but since those expenses
are apportioned among the three cases the mediator hears in a day, they
haven't amounted to much. The financial savings to the parties have been
enormous. In the coal industry alone, the parties have already saved half
a million dollars over the costs of arbitrating a like number of cases. The
average time from the request for mediation to the final resolution in
mediation has been 15 days. Finally, there has not been, on the whole,
any substantial diminution in the internal settlement rate-the rate at
which the parties resolve grievances.
The quality of outcomes in mediation has been impressive. While I do
not have time to describe some of the interesting settlements that have
been reached, I can say that those settlements have been very creative,
and have been settlements of a sort that typically could not be reached
in arbitration because of the limitations on the arbitrator's power.
We are beginning to find some evidence of improvement in settlement
skills. There are no statistical data on this, but both company and union
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representatives in some relationships report a change in the approach
to grievances at the earlier steps of the grievance procedure. They report
a change from an exclusive focus on who is right and who is wrong to
an effort to work out a mutually acceptable settlement. Indeed, some
report statements such as "When we get to mediation, the mediator is
going to try to make us work out a solution we both can live with. So
why don't we do it right here, and save money, and not have to go to the
mediator?" Well, that of course, is just what we are hoping for.
Perhaps the acid test of any innovative approach to grievance resolu-
tion is whether it meets the needs of the participants. In post-mediation
surveys, company operating personnel have preferred mediation over ar-
bitration by a ratio of six to one, and union local officers and committee-
men have preferred mediation over arbitration by a ratio of seven to one.
The grievants themselves have preferred mediation over arbitration by
a ratio of two to one-less than the others because they tend to be more
concerned with the outcome of their particular grievance than with the
grievance resolution process. Still, the grievants have preferred media-
tion over arbitration two to one. In explaining why they prefer mediation
to arbitration, members of each group refer to time and cost savings, but
what they focus on primarily tends to be the informality and problem-
solving approach of mediation. Thus, one company representative said,
"I like the informality. It creates an atmosphere of people trying to solve
problems through talk rather than being enemies in a legal process. This
is a much better way to approach these problems."
x. Negotiated Development
The negotiated development of land use projects described by
Livermore and Sutton, (LIVERMORE & SUTTON) appears to be a
response to the difficulties, frustration, and cost of resolving dif-
ferences over land use issues between developers, regulatory agen-
cies, and environmental groups. According to Livermore and Sut-
ton, "new" negotiated development focuses on the early involve-
ment of all parties capable of affecting the final decision to pro-
ceed and an expansion in the number of parties involved in the
process to insure that the perspectives of the varied interests are
included. In addition, "new" development negotiation extends to
almost every element of technical, environmental, economic, and
cultural impact, rather than just the narrow issue of whether the
project meets certain technological criteria. Finally, "new" nego-
tiated development processes often involve the use of a neutral in-
tervenor with expertise at counselling parties on process alter-
natives to the court system. In this procedure, all parties interested
in the land development negotiate the timing, shape, and exter-
nal effects of the project. Livermore and Sutton report several suc-
cessful negotiated developments, including the White Flint Mall
in Montgomery County, Maryland, the Whiskey Shoals project in
Mendocino County, California, and the Stanford University Faculty
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Housing Project on Peter Coutts Hill.
The Colorado Joint Review Process applied to the AMAX, Inc.'s
Mt. Emmons mining project is an example of a large-scale nego-
tiated development or environmental mediation. As described by
Biddle, Livermore, and Poe, the process involved the creation of
a voluntary intragovernmental process to coordinate the en-
vironmental and land use decision-making process among federal,
state, and local levels of the government, encourage cooperation
and understanding among industry, government, the public, and
special interest groups, provide a rational, systematic alternative
to the pre-existing fragmented governmental review processes, and
enhance and improve public participation in governmental deci-
sion-making to identify and minimize conflict, delays, and asso-
ciated costs (BIDDLE, LIVERMORE & POE).
xi. Regulatory Bargaining ("Reg-Neg")
Since decisions on major land use development projects require
the exercise of considerable discretion by regulators, a large amount
of bargaining inevitably occurs during the course of the decision-
making process. One of the latest innovations in the environmental
field involves the negotiation of regulations prior to their formal
issuance by an administrative agency (HARTER 1). In lieu of the
usual procedure-issuance of a proposed regulation, extensive com-
ment, promulgation of the final rules, and then, often, litigation-a
facilitator convenes all the interested parties in order to help them
negotiate a mutually acceptable rule, which is then routinely pro-
mulgated. Thus, "reg-neg," as it has been dubbed, involves a
substitution of accommodative problem-solving for adversarial
jousting-the same technique used in environmental dispute
resolution and in certain policy dialogues between environmen-
talists and industry, such as the National Coal Policy Project.
Although this technique is not limited to environmental issues,
it is peculiarly appropriate for them.
An example of "reg-neg" is the EPA's "bubble policy" which,
for the first time, allows industries to trade emissions among points
within an imaginary bubble surrounding the plant. As long as the
area affected by the plant's emissions continues to attain and main-
tain the ambient air quality standards, the plant is allowed to relax
controls at emission points where control costs are high in ex-
change for increasing controls at points where costs are lower
(KOK).
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The EPA claims that replacing controls on emission points where
the marginal cost of control was high with additional controls on
points with low marginal costs can reduce the cost of controlling
pollution sometimes by as much as fifty percent. Refinements of
the initial bubble policy have led to inter-industry trading of emis-
sion allowances, offset trading between old and new facilities, and
the banking of pollution credits (DRAYTON).
xii. Arbitration-Private and Court-Ordered
Lest we forget, arbitration is still considered by many institu-
tional litigants as the primary dispute resolution alternative. In
spite of the widespread criticism of arbitration as being slow, un-
reliable, expensive and time-consuming (LYONS), it is used to
resolve thousands of labor management and commercial disputes
each year (COULSON). Moreover, most studies show that arbitra-
tion continues to be faster and less expensive than adjudication.
Recent developments in arbitration have focussed on identify-
ing the situations, other than labor/management, where arbitra-
tion has greatest potential. An interesting use of arbitration to
resolve a complex patent infringement dispute is described by
Janicke and Borovoy. (JANICKE & BOROVOY). A workshop at the
Harvard Law School in July 1982, organized in response to the
Chief Justice's call for further research by the Bar on the use of
arbitration, identified several promising areas for reform and ex-
tension of arbitration.
The development of court-annexed, mandatory arbitration has
been one of the most far-reaching results of this resurgence of in-
terest in arbitration (GOLDBERG, GREEN, & SANDER 225; ROLPH).
Court-ordered arbitration was originally conceived as a device to
relieve court congestion by diverting relatively modest collection
and automobile personal injury and property damage claims. Thus,
the jurisdictional limits used to assign cases to court-ordered arbi-
tration were low, generally $5,000 to $10,000 or less, and excluded
most corporate disputes. Today, however, success with these pro-
grams has inspired proposals to raise the jurisdictional limits to
$100,000 and higher. If such proposals are widely adopted, many
corporate disputes will be captured by these programs.
Although the specific elements of court-ordered arbitration pro-
grams vary widely, the hearings usually take place before volunteer
arbitrators and are generally private, informal, and brief. Unlike
traditional, voluntary arbitration, however, neither party is bound
by the arbitrator's decision. If the parties accept the arbitrator's
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award, it is entered as a court judgment and is enforceable as such.
But if one party does not accept the arbitrator's award, the case
returns to the normal adjudicative process for a trial de novo in
which no evidence of the arbitration proceeding is admissible. In
short, because of concerns that failure to provide a trial de novo
will be considered a denial of due process, the compulsory nature
of arbitration is offset by its nonbinding quality. In order to
discourage frivolous requests for a trial de novo, most court-annexed
arbitration programs impose sanctions on a party that asks for a
trial de novo and is unsuccessful in improving the arbitration result.
Today over one hundred trial courts, in at least twelve states,
have adopted such programs, and experimental programs have
been implemented in three federal district courts. These programs
have been the subject of research projects by the American Bar
Association, the Federal Judicial Center, and the Rand Corpora-
tion's Institute for Civil Justice. Although these studies have not
conclusively established that court-ordered arbitration has met the
goals of its proponents, judicial and legislative enthusiasm for such
programs is high, and rules or legislation designed to establish or
encourage such programs have been proposed in many jurisdic-
tions. In 1984, Congress passed and the President signed P.L.
98-411 to appropriate $500,000 in fiscal year 1985 for eight addi-
tional federal court pilot programs. The National Institute for Dis-
pute Resolution has also given top priority to the encouragement,
coordination, and study of court-ordered arbitration.
A detailed study of the one court-annexed arbitration program
concluded that court administrators, individual litigants, and in-
stitutional litigants were satisfied with the quality of justice in the
program (ADLER, HENSON, & NELSON 60). The report concludes:
Institutional litigants who depend upon the arbitration program for
routine resolution of large numbers of civil suits also have rather simple
requirements. They too want a speedy, inexpensive procedure, but they
are less sensitive than individual litigants to the qualitative aspects of
the hearing process. They judge arbitration primarily on the basis of the
outcomes it delivers. They attribute unfavorable outcomes to the judge-
ment of the arbitrators, not to the lack of opportunity for discovery or
for cross-examining witnesses, or to the absence of other attributes of the
trial process. Most institutional litigants whom we interviewed find that
arbitration awards are generally within a predictable, acceptable range.
They deal with the occasional unsatisfactory award through the appeals
process, which they view as an essential "fail-safe" feature of the arbitra-
tion program (ADLER, HENSON, & NELSON 76).
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C. Integrating Alternatives into the Corporate Legal Culture
Despite the development and wide-spread dissemination during
the last five to ten years of many potentially useful alternative
dispute resolution models, such models still are utilized, or even
considered, in few cases. ADR pledges and policy statements,
numerous bar conferences on ADR, and exhortations by the Chief
Justice and the Presidents of the ABA and Harvard University have
had a marginal effect. Corporations and other institutions, are par-
ticularly well-suited to realize more of the benefits of alternative
dispute resolution processes by integrating alternatives into their
normal business and legal practices. This can be done:
- prospectively, through the use of dispute resolution clauses
in agreements;
- contemporaneously, through the use of systematic procedures
to evaluate the "ADR potential" of every case;
- retrospectively, but with an eye to the future, through the use
of systematized conflict management systems that monitor
the origins, costs, and results of both open and closed cases.
1. Dispute Resolution Contract Clauses
At the time a dispute arises, it is often difficult for the disputing
parties to agree on a procedure for resolving that dispute other than
negotiation or adjudication. At that time, any proposal to attempt
a novel procedure, however well-intentioned or well-designed, is
apt to be viewed with the suspicion that it is an effort to gain a
tactical advantage. This suggests that parties who are entering into
a business relationship in which there is a substantial likelihood
of future disputes should focus at that time, before any concrete
dispute exists, on developing a sound procedure by which to resolve
future disputes. In this way, they can avoid drifting into litigation,
which could be avoided, solely because they failed to focus in a
timely fashion on developing an alternative.
Despite this, the use of dispute resolution contract clauses is
limited. Many people find it psychologically difficult to think about
possible future conflict when entering into what they hope will be
a harmonious relationship. Contracting parties are often reluctant
to create a potential conflict over the terms of a dispute resolution
clause in order to achieve the uncertain benefits of efficiently resolv-
ing those conflicts that may arise in the future. Another deterrent
to raising the possibility of future disputes is that it may be seen
as indicating a lack of commitment to the relationship.
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As the probability or likely severity of future conflict increases,
these psychological barriers to discussing a dispute resolution
clause diminish. Thus, virtually every collective bargaining con-
tract contains a detailed, and frequently individualized procedure
for the resolution of disputes arising under that contract. Similarly,
many joint venture agreements contain carefully drafted dispute
resolution clauses. Most commercial contracts, however, contain
no dispute resolution clause at all, or at best they contain a boiler-
plate provision for arbitration pursuant to the rules of the American
Arbitration Association.
While arbitration is a useful dispute resolution procedure in many
cases, it is simply a private form of adjudication and may not
always be the best approach. One alternative to an arbitration
clause is a provision that requires the contracting parties in the
event of a future dispute to negotiate in good faith about its resolu-
tion before either party may commence litigation. The existence
of such a clause may avoid or reduce the scope of an incipient
dispute simply by bringing the parties together. Once they are
together and negotiating, the dynamics of the negotiation process
and the desire to succeed at negotiation may dispose them toward
settlement, rather than turning the dispute over to lawyers or to
a third party for decision. One reason that contracting parties may
use a negotiate-in-good-faith clause is because they foresee the
likelihood of future disputes but are unable to specify what form
they may take. Alternatively, they may be unable at the time of
contracting to agree on a structured dispute resolution procedure,
yet wish to provide some protection against the risk of drifting
into litigation.
Where both of the contracting parties are large corporations,
there is a possibility that disputes will arise because the individuals
charged with implementing the contract are not aware of or do not
share the higher level managers' understanding of the transaction.
To deal with this eventuality, the contract might provide that future
disputes, unresolved at lower levels, be negotiated in good faith
by the managers who signed the agreement. Of course, this type
of clause requires a willingness on the part of managers to involve
themselves in the dispute resolution process. This willingness can
be stimulated by ensuring that the economic impact of disputes
is accurately targeted. For example, if litigation expenses are
charged to the operating unit in which the dispute arises, rather
than to the legal department, there is an incentive for senior man-
agement to participate is dispute resolution procedures because
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the cost of resolving the dispute will have a direct impact on the
profitability of its units.
The aspirational command approach of a negotiate-in-good-faith
clause may not be sufficient in some situations. Another device
for encouraging settlement, sometimes combined with a negotiate-
in-good-faith clause, is a cooling-off period. Under this procedure,
the complaining party must give notice to the other of its intent
to litigate. The recipient of the complaint can then request that
a meeting be set to discuss the matter. If the meeting does not lead
to resolution, litigation cannot commence until after the expira-
tion of the cooling-off period. This provides one last opportunity
for settlement before the freezing of positions that often accom-
panies the commencement of litigation.
Another litigation-avoidance approach is a least-favored-choice-
of-forum clause, providing that whichever party initiates litigation
must proceed in the other party's home forum. Since each may
be reluctant to litigate in a location in which the other party has
the advantage of an established presence, they have a further in-
centive to resolve the dispute without litigation. The risk of such
a clause is that a party with a valid complaint may find itself forced
to litigate in a disfavored forum, which will put it at a disadvan-
tage in settlement negotiations.
A contractual provision for a nonbinding dispute resolution pro-
cess, such as mediation or a mini-trial, may be attractive to busi-
ness people because those procedures are simply structured varia-
tions of the bargaining that characterizes business relationships.
In normal business contexts, bargaining on behalf of the corpora-
tion with its suppliers, customers, employees, regulators, and
others is frequently structured in a hierarchical manner that moves
from negotiation to mediatory or arbitral forms (CLARK). Conflict
resolution is first attempted at lower levels without third-party in-
tervention and in a relatively informal atmosphere. If this is un-
successful, the problem is referred to successively higher levels
of authority and, typically, the bargaining process becomes more
formal. If the dispute is between subordinates within the corpora-
tion, the normal end step is for a senior manager either to mediate
or arbitrate a solution (BRETT 674). Viewed in this light, a media-
tion or mini-trial dispute resolution provision in a contract is simply
an extension of normal business practice.
Examples of model mediation and model mini-trial clauses can
be found in Dispute Resolution (GOLDBERG, GREEN, & SANDER 550
et seq.). By necessity, any model clause must be rather general.
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But the more details that can be agreed on at contract time, the
easier it will be to implement the dispute resolution process when
conflict erupts. At the least, the parties should try to specify either
a particular person as the third-party neutral, a process to select
the neutral, or an instituion to convene the process and select the
neutral. Prior agreement on this point will ensure the involvement
early in the dispute of a third party who can assist the parties in
negotiating the other details of the dispute resolution process.
Another way in which alternatives may be integrated into the
legal function is by specifying in consent decrees dispute resolu-
tion procedures for future disputes. One example is the General
Motors arbitration program approved by the FTC to resolve con-
sumer complaints in the "engine switch" case. 15 Another exam-
ple is a 1983 consent decree in a major trade secrets dispute be-
tween IBM and Hitachi Ltd. that provided that any future disputes
about the alleged improper use of IBM trade secrets by Hitachi
would be resolved by negotiations between designated executives
or, failing that, by a special arbitration panel consisting of the two
executives and a preselected neutral chairman (ALTERNATIVES,
IBM-Hitachi).
2. Enforceability of Dispute Resolution Clauses
One advantage that arbitration clauses have over other dispute
resolution procedures is that over forty jurisdictions have enacted
statutes guaranteeing enforcement of such clauses. 16 Courts
typically interpret these statutes broadly, citing federal and state
policy in favor of arbitration. 17 Similarly, the New York Conven-
tion of 1958 provides for the enforceability of most international
arbitration awards in the courts of signatory countries. But even
in this well-established context enforceability is not automatic. Both
domestically and internationally, there are numerous situations
in which public policy or conflicting statutory commands have been
held to render void agreements to arbitrate future commercial
disputes or the awards themselves.
The enforceability of a mediation or mini-trial clause is uncer-
tain. Because of the relative novelty of such clauses, there are no
cases directly on point. Some commentators (PHILLIPS & OLSON)
15. In the Matter of General Motors, 102 F.T.C. 1741 (1983).
16. See, e.g., Uniform Arbitration Act § 1; United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
17. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 53
U.S.L.W. 5069 (July 2, 1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 104 S.Ct. 852 (1984).
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state that a mediation or mini-trial clause would not be specifically
enforceable because it does not obligate either party to convey any
ultimate benefit on the other. Since such a clause does not obligate
either party to settle, the party who is trying to enforce the provi-
sion is not damaged by the other side's refusal to participate in
the process. In fact, the nonbreaching party is saved money by the
other side's refusal to engage in the process when it has determined
not to settle. A related argument against the enforceability of
dispute resolution clauses providing for nonbinding processes is
that if one party is refusing to engage in the process, it must be
because it is unwilling to settle, and courts will not order parties
to engage in a futile process.
Green and Jacobs argue that dispute resolution clauses that
clearly specify the obligations of each party can and should be en-
forced (GREEN & JAcoBs 95). They take issue with the premise that
such clauses convey no benefit and are futile, because they do not
ensure ultimate agreement when one party is participating involun-
tarily. For example, in discussing the mini-trial, Green and Jacobs
point out:
The mini-trial process begins with rather abstract, non-threatening discus-
sions concerning procedure and evolves slowly toward a resolution of the
underlying substantive dispute. By the time the parties actually conduct
the mini-trial and the executives meet, they are psychologically oriented
toward settlement. Further, once all preparation for the mini-trial has been
completed, the lawyers are also looking to settlement. Thus it is not
beyond the realm of possibility that a resisting party forced into a mini-
trial may be gradually reoriented toward cooperation and eventual
settlement.
Green and Jacobs also point out that courts enforce negotiate-
in-good-faith obligations under the National Labor Relations Act.
Archibald Cox (Cox 1412), defending the statutory imposition of
this obligation, has stated:
Participation in debate often produces changes in a seemingly fixed posi-
tion either because new facts are brought to light or because the strengths
and weaknesses of the several arguments become apparent. Sometimes,
the parties hit upon some novel compromise of an issue which has been
thrashed over and over. Much is gained even by giving each side a better
picture of the strength of the other's convictions. The cost is so slight that
the potential gains easily justify legal compulsion to engage in the dis-
cussion.
3. Systematic Evaluation of Cases for ADR Potential
Many disputes occur between parties who have had no prior con-
tact or legal relationship. In such cases there is no opportunity to
plan a dispute resolution process for future disputes. Moreover, in
many cases in which there is a prior relationship and an oppor-
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tunity to plan for the handling of future disputes, the parties fail
to do so. In such cases, there is a need to evaluate systematically
each case to determine its suitability for alternative dispute resolu-
tion. Without a systematic approach, cases that could profitably
be diverted to an alternative process may, because of inertia, be
left to adjudication.
Allocating particular cases to a specific process is the same task
that, on the public level, confronts the designer of any adjudicatory
tracking system or diversion program. It is the same task facing
the person who operates the doors in the multidoor courthouse.
In incorporating alternatives into the corporate legal culture, cor-
porate counsel must themselves develop guidelines to determine
not only the suitability of a particular case on their docket for some
alternative, but also to determine which alternative is best for that
dispute.
Very little theoretical or empirical progress has been made in
this area. The following Table, albeit not empirically tested, draws
on the experience of many dispute resolution practitioners, and
may be helpful in systematically evaluating cases for their dispute
resolution potential:
TABLE V.
I. Barriers to Negotiation
A. Lack of a comprehensive theory of negotiation
B. Failure of adequate preparation (fact-gathering and
analysis as well as strategic planning)
C. Failure of effective communication
D. Emotional Factors
E. Extrinsic factors
1. Linkage
2. Preexisting commitments
3. Time value of money
4. Tactical use of litigation
F. Different estimates of alternative to agreement (i.e.,
likelihood of success)
1. Different information
2. Different assessments of the same information
3. Different legal analyses
G. Constituency pressures
H. Stakes not suited to compromise
1. Intensely held personal values that cannot be
voluntarily conceded
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2. Economic survival threatened
I. Different attitudes to risk
J. Different attitudes toward desirability of prompt
settlement
K. No zone of agreement
II. General Case Characteristics
A. Type of issues-law, fact, mixed
B. Matter of principle or vital interest
C. Routine or novel
D. Complex, technical law or facts, or simple, straightfor-
ward case
E. Linkage (precedent) problems or opportunities
F. Amount at stake
G. Type of relief sought
III. Nature of the Parties
A. Continuing relationship or one-shot
B. Power disparities
C. Emotional factors
D. Other disputes (past, pending, or future)
IV. Situational Factors
A. Settlement position gap
B. Assessment of outcome gap
C. Stakes/transaction costs ratio
D. Counsel
E. Judge, jury, jurisdiction
F. Timing (status of the case)
G. Dispositive motion opportunities
H. Need to gather more facts
I. Need for experts
J. History of prior settlement efforts
K. Opportunities for integrative solutions
L. Strength of case
M. Publicity/privacy concerns
N. Desire for faster, less expensive dispute resolution
method
Assessing disputes for their alternative dispute resolution poten-
tial begins with an analysis of why the case has not been settled
through negotiation. As the outline indicates, negotiations fail for
several reasons, many of which can be addressed by changing or
improving the dispute resolution process. For example, if a negotia-
tion impasse is caused by widely different estimates of the
278 [Vol. 1:2
CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE
likelihood of success at trial, the give and take on likely trial out-
come that takes place during the information exchange portion
of the mini-trial, or the opinion of the neutral advisor, may cause
one or both parties to reevaluate their estimates of success and
thus close the settlement gap between them. The mini-trial's focus
on negotiating the underlying business dispute provides an addi-
tional basis for settlement. On the other hand, if the impasse to
settlement is caused by emotions or poor communication, media-
tion may be indicated.
After analyzing the factors that have prevented negotiation from
being successful, a systematic evaluation of the dispute should
focus on general case characteristics, nature of the parties, and
special situational factors. For example, if the dispute involves
purely factual issues or mixed fact and law issues, alternatives are
appropriate. But if it involves purely legal issues, summary judg-
ment procedures may be speedier, less expensive, and provide a
more definitive answer than any nonjudicial process. If the par-
ties are involved in a continuing relationship or the relief requested
involves continuing interaction between the parties, a mutually
acceptable solution is important for both parties, and the chances
of devising one voluntarily are increased. On the other hand, if the
case involves a deeply held principle or the vital interest of one
or both parties, they may be unable to accept any resolution other
than a judicial decree.
The existence of power disparities between the parties must also
be considered when contemplating the use of an alternative
mechanism. Thus, a dispute between an individual consumer and
a large manufacturer may not be appropriate for mediation because
of the substantial power disparity between them.
Among the situational factors that will influence the choice of
a settlement process is the ratio of transaction costs to stakes.
Whenever the transaction costs are high relative to the stakes, alter-
natives have a high probability of succeeding because of the poten-
tial cost savings.
4. Clarfying Corporate Objectives
Guidelines for evaluating cases for their ADR potential are not
enough, however, without a procedure for ensuring that they are
applied. Thus, corporate law departments should make it part of
their standard operating procedure to apply these or other
guidelines to each dispute at every stage in its development, from
initial assertion through trial and appeal. In addition, the corporate
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client must take affirmative steps to inform the outside lawyers
that it retains of its commitment to cost-effective dispute resolu-
tion including the use of ADR. In many cases, outside lawyers can
justify their use of costly but traditional adversarial procedures on
the basis that the client wants the most vigorous pursuit of vic-
tory that money can buy, regardless of the effect on the court
system, the opponent, or even larger but unrelated corporate ob-
jectives. The ethics of the legal profession and standards of prac-
tice today support the pursuit of a win-at-any cost frame of mind
on the part of retained counsel. Unless corporate objectives are
more broadly framed and communicated to retained counsel,
private lawyers may feel reluctant to suggest a different, more ac-
commodative approach.
Under the leadership of vice president and general counsel Robert
Banks, Xerox Corporation has taken positive steps to remedy this
situation "by changing the legal culture" in one respect (ALTER-
NATIVES, Xerox). At Banks' suggestion, Xerox President David T.
Kearns issued formal instructions to all lawyers representing Xerox
that, as a client, Xerox wants all lawsuits waged on its behalf to
be conducted with a "regard for the need of an efficient system
of justice." Kearns' instructions specified:
We will insist when you appear on our behalf that you have as one of your
primary objectives the support and maintenance of an efficient court
system as required by the letter and spirit of the recently amended Federal
Rules. Since this is consistent with your professional obligations, I do not
see it as a direction that you can find objectionable.
However, I am advised that many misuses and abuses of our judicial
system are justified by practitioners on the basis of an obligation to the
client. The exhaustion of adversarial opportunities is characterized as the
epitome of professional dedication to the client. Our system demands
dedication to the client but there must always be trade-offs.
To implement Kearns' directive, Banks responded with a set of
litigation guidelines prepared by an ACCA committee. These
guidelines were sent, with Kearns' statement, to every lawyer
representing Xerox, "as an instruction from the client with all of
the professional obligations that that implies," that "Xerox at-
torneys cannot justify extreme advocacy positions on the ground
that the client expects it of us."
The ACCA guidelines focus on implementation of Rules 11, 16,
and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but they address
aspects of litigation from the filing of the complaint through
discovery, trial, and use of sanctions. Two of the guidelines are
of particular interest here.
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Guideline No. 3 to Rule I I states:
Upon receipt of a compliant, and if possible prior to the
time an answer is due, the attorney having primary re-
sponsibility for defending the Company shall initiate dis-
cussions with opposing counsel in order to determine the
following:
1. The precise nature of the claim;
2. the propriety of the lawyer's client as defendant;
3. the prospect of using alternative dispute resolution in
resolving the claim.
Guideline No. I to Rule 16 states:
Whether or not local rules may exempt the application of
Federal Rule 16, lawyers representing the Company shall
within 30 days of the commencement of court litigation,
prepare a strategy for addressing the case. Such strategy
shall include an assessment of settlement possibilities
and an identification of the key factual and/or legal issues
in the case as they then appear to them. Unless early
settlement seems likely, the attorneys shall also set forth
the particular discovery they propose to take with respect
to the issues identified....
The proposed strategy will be reviewed and agreed to
by the General Counsel or his or her designee prior to sub-
mission of papers for the first pretrial conference.
These guidelines are an example of one leading corporate con-
sumer of legal services attempting to reform the legal culture by:
(1) internalizing greater control over the corporate legal function;
(2) redefining corporate legal objectives more broadly than "win-
ning;" (3) insisting on accountability for strategic and tactical litiga-
tion decisions; and (4) endorsing the use of private and creative
nonjudicial dispute resolution techniques. When supported by
close monitoring and management techniques, such guidelines
form part of an operational system that can integrate alternatives
into the corporate legal culture more than is now the case.
D. Corporate Litigants, Alternatives, and Public Values
Is it possible to realize the benefits that informal, accommodative
dispute resolution promises without sacrificing important values
such as fairness, openness, rationality, and predictability which
are thought to be now protected by the formal public dispute pro-
cessing system? Critics of alternatives raise this question gener-
ically, but usually with an eye toward alternative resolution of small
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claims cases, minor neighborhood disputes, and extended impact
cases (GOLDBERG, GREEN, & SANDER 490; FISS; ABEL; AUERBACH;
NADER). These issues require special consideration when alter-
natives are applied to cases in which one or both parties is a large
institution such as a major corporation. Where one party is a large
corporation and the other is an individual or smaller organization,
there is a danger that the weaker party will be at a greater disad-
vantage in an alternative dispute resolution process than it would
be in court. And even where all parties to a dispute are equal in
power, there is a danger that the use of private forms of dispute
resolution may serve to facilitate arrangements that are not in the
public interest and never come to the public's attention.
With regard to the first danger, power disparity between institu-
tional and individual disputants, the problem is that institutions
tend to be "repeat players" rather than "one-shotters" in the litiga-
tion process (GALANTER, Why the 'Haves'). According to Galanter,
an "ideal type" repeat player is "a unit which has had and an-
ticipates repeated litigation, which has low stakes in the outcome
of any one case, and which has the resources to pursue its long
run interests." The "ideal type" one-shotter, "is a unit whose
claims are too large (relative to his size) or too small (relative to
the cost of remedies) to be managed routinely and rationally." As
Galanter points out, the same types, and much of the same analysis
regarding the dynamics of disputing, apply to the entire range of
dispute processing mechanisms and not just to adjudication.
According to Galanter, repeat players have nine advantages over
one-shotters in playing the litigation game:
1. repeat players have advance intelligence and are therefore able to build
a record and structure the next transaction according to their likes (i.e.
write the form contract);
2. repeat players enjoy economies of scale, have low start up cost for any
case, develop expertise, and have ready access to specialists;
3. repeat players have established helpful relationships with people who run
the dispute resolution institutions;
4. the repeat player can adopt a tough position by declaring his need to
establish commitment to his bargaining position to enhance his bargain-
ing reputation;
5. assuming stakes are relatively small for the repeat player, he can play
the odds and adopt strategies calculated to maximize gain over a long
series of cases even where this involves the risk of maximum loss in some
cases; in contrast, the one-shotter is more likely to adopt a "minimax"
strategy;
6. repeat players can expend resources in influencing the making of the rele-
vant rules of the litigation game, such as by lobbying rule makers;
7. repeat players can forego short term results in favor of long term gains
in litigation itself, thus creating favorable precedent;
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8. repeat players can concentrate their resources on disputes that are likely
to make a tangible difference in operative rules;
9. repeat players are better able to invest resources to secure the penetra-
tion of rules favorable to them.
Galanter points out that not all repeat players are "haves" in
terms of power, wealth, and status. An example of a "have not"
repeat player is the alcoholic or repeat criminal defendant.
However, most repeat players are larger, richer, and more power-
ful than most one-shotters. Clearly, most corporations and other
large private institutions are not only repeat players, but "haves."
Galanter's taxonomy of litigation by strategic configuration of
parties depicts cases in which repeat players sue one-shotters as
the most numerous types of cases in our legal system. These are
cases, he claims, where the law is used for routine processing of
claims by parties for whom the making of such claims is a regular
business activity. There are not many cases outside the personal
injury area in which one-shotters sue repeat players. When they
do, "it usually represents the attempt of some OS (one-shotter) to
invoke outside help to create leverage on an organization. ... "
Litigation between repeat players (intercorporate disputes) is
rare, Galanter contends, because:
the expectation of continued mutually beneficial interaction would give
rise to informal bilateral controls .... Units with mutually beneficial rela-
tions do not adjust their differences in court. Where they rely on third
parties in dispute-resolution, it is likely to take a form (such as arbitra-
tion or a domestic tribunal) detached from official sanctions and apply-
ing domestic rather than official rules.
Exceptions to this rule are litigation involving the government as
one of the repeat players and situations where the repeat players
do not repeatedly deal with each other. "The large one-time deal
that falls through, the marginal enterprise-these are staple sources
of litigation."
In any event, it is important to note that when litigation is be-
tween a one-shotter and a repeat player, one party is a
bureaucratically organized professional who enjoys strategic ad-
vantages. When the litigation is between one-shotters or between
repeat players on both sides, generally there are continuing "multi-
stranded relationships with attendant informal controls. Litigation
appears when the relationship loses its future value .... "
Because the repeat players' advantages carry over to non-
litigation modes of dispute resolution also, Galanter's model of
repeat players and one-shotters has obvious meaning for alternative
dispute resolution of cases in which an organizational party is also
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wealthy, powerful, and equipped with the latest computerized case
management techniques and expertise. The advantages of ex-
perience and organization in dispute processing are so obvious that
one of the reforms suggested by Galanter to equalize the power
between the haves and have nots is to organize the have nots into
parties "that have the ability to act in a coordinated fashion, play
long-run strategies, benefit from high grade legal services, and so
forth;" in short, to organize the one-shotters into repeat playing
organizations. According to Galanter, this would not only create
situations in which both parties were organized to pursue litiga-
tion, but it would tend to cause continued dealings between par-
ties, which encourages resort to private systems of dispute settle-
ment. Thus, we would expect our reforms to produce a dual move-
ment: the official systems would be "legalized" while the prolifera-
tion of private systems would "delegalize" many relationships.
Many of Galanter's observations are borne out by the CLRP
survey (TRUBEK). For example, legal fees are a higher percentage
of all litigation costs for individuals than for corporations (88% vs.
72%), suggesting that employees of organizational litigants (repeat
players) spend more time on cases than do individuals. Moreover,
if the CLRP analysis is correct that litigation involves an invest-
ment analysis in a series of decisions made under conditions of
uncertainty, it would suggest that repeat players (organizations)
are better equipped to handle litigation, because organizations
engage in this type of analysis as a regular part of their business.
Moreover, as Bodily confirms, corporations have a much different
attitude towards risk than do individuals (BODILY).
The CLRP study also shows that although organizational plain-
tiffs have a higher recovery to fee ratio against individual defen-
dants than do individual plaintiffs against organizational defen-
dants, the differences are not significant. Table 24 of the CLRP
study shows the highest recovery to fee ratio is in cases where an
organizational plaintiff sued an organizational defendant and the
difference appears significant. Finally, the "success" (net recovery/
stakes ratio) is much higher for cases in which organizations sue
individuals than when individuals sue organizations. Finally, since
most of what goes on in adjudication is negotiation and settlement,
the implications of this data regarding organizational litigation for
alternative dispute resolution is that organizations will have the
same advantages and show the same margin of success over indi-
viduals in alternative dispute processing forums as they do in court.
Thus, any analysis of institutional dispute resolution must take
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into account the peculiar nature of the organization. Corporations
and other private institutions have a continuing existence, ac-
cumulated capital resources, sophistication, expertise, and access
to legal services far exceeding those of individuals. In many cases,
the disputes in which organizations are involved are characteriz-
ed by a continuing relationship with the other disputant. Also,
where the other disputant is a smaller organization or individual,
significant power disparities may affect the resources each side can
devote to the dispute and the staying power of the disputants. Fur-
ther, organizations tend to take an economic rather than emotional
or moral viewpoint of their disputes and conduct them in a strategic
way with an eye on long term results, including the generation of
norms and rules to govern future action. In contrast, individuals
tend to view disputes more as matters of principle, to focus on
short-run results, and not to care as much about the generation
of long-term rules or norms. Many of these differences result from
the organization's perspective that disputes are a natural, antici-
pated by-product of business to be managed like any other part
of the business, rather than an extraordinary event raising ques-
tions of personal integrity, principle, and economic survival.
These factors create special opportunities for the resolution of
institutional disputes, but they also create special problems. Op-
portunities are created through the expertise of institutional
disputants in the disputing process. Institutions can be expected
to act more rationally and to take steps to reduce waste and un-
necessary transaction costs. The continuing existence of institu-
tions and the long term perspective they tend to take can encourage
the use of anticipation and prevention techniques. Corporate struc-
ture can foster accountability for actions and decisions that create
or intensify claims, grievances, and disputes.
These same factors also raise problems that must be address-
ed. Despite criticisms to the contrary, by and large the courts have
been an equalizer of power between the large and small. Will the
powerless be at a relatively greater disadvantage outside the
courts? As long as access to the courts is preserved and not made
more difficult by mandatory participation in an alternative pro-
cess, are power disparities neutralized? In this respect, the non-
mandatory alternative dispute resolution processes described
above pose fewer problems than the mandatory, court-ordered ar-
bitration programs that are becoming more widespread, although
none of the programs go so far as to foreclose access to courts
altogether.
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The corporate structure that fosters accountability can also lead
to buck passing and a lack of responsibility within the corpora-
tion for responsible handling of disputes. This same bureaucratic
structure and the fact of continuing corporate existence can lead
to secrecy, collusion, and combinations in violation of public policy
through the use of dispute processing techniques that are less visi-
ble than adjudication or other formal dispute processes. The mini-
trial, rent-a-judge, and regulatory barganing approaches are
susceptible to criticism on this ground. Finally, the proliferation
of alternative dispute resolution processes and techniques could
encourage institutions to engage in strategic disputing to preserve
tactical advantages.
Cutting across these concerns, an examination of organizational
disputes must take into account the peculiar role of the corporate
counsel. How will the move towards greater internalization of the
corporate legal function affect the resolution of corporate disputes?
Will internalization of the corporate legal function make corpora-
tions more responsible and responsive to society's needs, or more
parochial and self-protective? Are in-house lawyers less indepen-
dent and objective than outside counsel? If so, will this promote
or retard the fair, effective, and efficient resolution of disputes?
Another concern is the increasingly multi-jurisdictional aspect
of institutional disputes. Ours is not only a corporate society, but
it is a multinational corporate society. Disputes between interna-
tional corporations today raise questions requiring consideration
of the law of foreign nations as well as the law of sister states, and
reconciliation of important national policies. What implications
does the internationalization of business have for our formal and
informal dispute resolution systems?
It would be foolhardy to attempt a definitive answer to these ques-
tions now, but an indication of their importance (and possibly the
direction of their resolution is last term's decision by the United
States Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth Inc. 18 In that case, the Supreme Court held an alternative
dispute resolution (arbitration) clause in an agreement between
a Puerto Rican corporation and a Japanese-American joint ven-
ture to be binding and enforceable even with respect to claims of
violation of American antitrust laws and even though it meant the
elimination of the statutory treble damage provision. In rejecting
the view of the Justice Department that the Sherman Act
18. 53 U.S.L.W. 5069.
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"trumped" the arbitration clause, the Court stated, "the expan-
sion of American business and industry will hardly be encouraged
if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial con-
cept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our
courts. . . ." The Court also reiterated what it views as a strong
federal policy favoring arbitration. But in abandoning an earlier
doctrine based on the primacy of statutory policy and the impor-
tance of the treble damage remedy, 19 the Court opened the possi-
bility that a prospective litigant, at least in the international con-
text, might provide in advance for any form of mutually accept-
able dispute resolution procedure for any statutory or common law
claim. If this proves true, the prospects for vastly increased use
of alternative dispute resolution contract clauses is great.
E. Conclusion
Even less is known about the special world of institutional
disputes than is know about the so-called world or ordinary litiga-
tion. The dearth of empirical data is extraordinary. Theoretical con-
structs are primitive. In an effort to cut costs, there has been a surge
of interest by institutions in alternative dispute resolution processes
and techniques, but the effect of such processes and techniques
on the total dispute resolution picture is unclear. Many of the pro-
cesses and techniques appear to offer important opportunities to
achieve not only less expensive, but perhaps better dispute resolu-
tion and management. However, the use of such processes also
raises problems and concerns. As long as these problems and con-
cerns are addressed, corporate experimentation, development, and
use of alternatives should be encouraged.
19. See American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. MaGuire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968).
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